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Abstract 
The objective of this research was to examine some incentive and informational 
properties of contingent valuation surveys and provide some suggestions in survey design. 
The contingent valuation method uses survey questions to elicit individuals’ preferences for 
nonmarket goods. The essential task of a contingent valuation exercise is to design a 
questionnaire which elicits respondents’ preference for the good being valued.  
This dissertation includes three essays that contribute to the contingent valuation 
literature. The contingent valuation method is widely used in estimating the economic value 
of nonmarket goods. The first essay offers an empirical test of a theoretical result in the 
contingent valuation literature, which argues that respondents will respond to survey 
questions truthfully, if they perceive the survey as being “consequential”, regardless of the 
degree of consequentiality. The second essay tests the commitment cost theory suggested by 
Zhao and Kling (2001, 2004). They argue that a respondent’s willingness to pay for a good at 
a particular point of time depends not only on the intrinsic value of the good, but also on the 
timing of the decision and the characteristics of the market environment. The third study 
examines whether three value elicitation formats—the dichotomous choice question, the 
multinomial choice question, and a modified multinomial choice question suggested by 
Carson and Groves (2007)—provide comparable welfare estimates.  
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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
 
1. 1. Introduction  
The contingent valuation method uses survey questions to elicit individuals’ 
preferences for nonmarket goods. The essential task of a contingent valuation exercise is to 
design a questionnaire which elicits respondents’ preference for the good being valued. The 
objective of this research was to examine some incentive and informational properties of 
contingent valuation surveys and provide some suggestions in survey design. This 
dissertation includes three essays. The first two essays of this study employ data from two 
years of the “Iowa Lakes Valuation Project.” The Iowa Lakes Valuation Project is a four-
year panel study aimed at understanding the recreational use and the economic value of 
improved water quality in the primary recreational lakes in the state of Iowa. In order to 
understand the physical processes that influence water quality, Iowa State University 
Limnology Laboratory designed a five-year project to gather physical water quality 
information for 132 of Iowa’s principle recreation lakes. The Iowa Lakes Valuation Project 
was designed to complement the research done by the Iowa State University Limnology 
Laboratory by gathering respondents’ recreational use patterns, objective measures of water 
quality, and the economic value of water quality improvement for the same set of 
recreational lakes in Iowa.  
Respondents’ willingness to pay is one way of representing the economic value of 
water quality improvement in Iowa lakes. Willingness to pay is the amount of income an 
individual is willing to give up for an improvement in circumstances. In the 2003 and 2005 
versions of the Iowa Lakes Valuation Project questionnaires, respondents’ willingness to pay 
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for a water quality improvement scenario at one of eight focus lakes was collected via a 
contingent valuation referendum. These lakes were selected in consultation with the Iowa 
Department of Natural Resources. In addition to being geographically dispersed, these lakes 
are of policy interest and various restoration projects are being considered.   
The first essay offers an empirical test of a theoretical result in the contingent 
valuation literature. In particular, it has been argued that respondents will respond to survey 
questions truthfully, if they perceive the survey as being “consequential”, regardless of the 
degree of consequentiality. The argument further states that if respondents do not believe the 
survey to be consequential, economic theory can make no prediction about the responses. In 
this study, respondents’ perceived consequentiality toward the survey was directly elicited 
using ordinal rankings ranging from “1” to “5.” Given the potential endogeniety of 
individuals’ “consequentiality” responses, in the 2005 version of survey, a subsample of the 
respondents was randomly assigned information suggesting their responses were important 
and would have direct impact on policy decisions. This exogenous treatment allows us to 
separate the impact of consequentiality on respondents’ contingent valuation responses.  
We employ a Bayesian treatment effect model to test whether respondents’ 
perceptions of consequentiality has an impact on their willingness to pay for a hypothetical 
water quality improvement scenario. In particular, we test the theory by determining if the 
willingness to pay distributions are the same for each value of the ordinal responses. 
The objective of the second essay is to test the commitment cost theory suggested by 
Zhao and Kling (2001, 2004). Typically, a respondent’s willingness to pay is assumed to 
depend on some intrinsic value of the good that is invariant over time. However, they argue 
that a respondent’s willingness to pay for a good at a particular point of time depends not 
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only on the intrinsic value of the good, but also on the timing of the decision and the 
characteristics of the market environment. In particular, the commitment cost theory predicts 
that individuals would report a lower willingness to pay, if they expect (a) that delaying the 
transaction decision is possible, (b) that learning more information about the transaction in 
the future is possible, and (c) that reversing the transaction decision is difficult. If the 
intertemporal aspects of the contingent valuation referendum influence respondents’ reported 
willingness to pay as the commitment cost theory predicts, the researchers should carefully 
convey not only the attributes of the project, but also the relevant intertemporal aspect of the 
project in their contingent valuation survey.  
In this study, we randomize the survey instrument so that half of the 2003 sample 
receives a survey where they are told that they will have a second chance to revisit the 
contingent valuation referendum if the referendum is not passed. With this explicit statement 
of delay, we expect to separate out the impact of delay on respondents’ willingness to pay. 
Next, we use respondents’ perceptions of intertemporal aspects such as delay, learning, and 
reversal elicited in the 2003 version of survey to examine how these dynamic factors 
influence respondents’ willingness to pay.  
In the 2005 version of survey, we test the impact of delay with another approach. In 
particular, half of the 2005 sample is informed that there will be no opportunity to revisit the 
referendum in the future whereas the other half is told nothing about possible chances to 
revisit the question. We use this exogenous treatment to examine the impact of the 
immediacy on respondents’ willingness to pay. Finally, besides respondents’ perceived 
potential for delay, we use respondents’ self-reported knowledge level and knowledge 
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increment about the general water quality in Iowa lakes elicited in the 2005 version of survey 
to examine how respondents’ knowledge perceptions influence their willingness to pay.  
The third essay employs data from a web-based survey aimed at assessing farmers’ 
perceptions, preferences, and reactions to alternative agricultural landscapes with increased 
perennial land cover in the state of Iowa. Perennial crops are of policy interest due to their 
environmental benefits, especially in water quality and wildlife habitat. In this contingent 
valuation survey, various value elicitation formats are employed to estimate respondents’ 
willingness to accept for adopting perennial strips in landscape. These elicitation formats 
include the dichotomous choice question, the multinomial choice question, and a modified 
multinomial choice question suggested by Carson and Groves (2007). The purpose of this 
study is to examine whether these value elicitation formats provide comparable welfare 
estimates. Six landscape policy alternatives are considered. To estimate respondents’ 
willingness to accept for these alternatives in a dichotomous choice question, fifteen 
combinations are used. We develop an estimation procedure to jointly estimate the responses 
from these questions. In addition, we extend Cameron’s (1988) bid function model for the 
dichotomous choice question to individuals’ responses to the multinomial choice question. 
Similar to the dichotomous choice question, we use the variance of the hypothetical bid 
values embedded in the multinomial choice question across the alternatives and the 
individuals to identify the regression coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix for the 
multinomial choice question.  
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1. 2. Dissertation Organization 
Each essay in this dissertation is an individual chapter, with its own introduction, 
conclusion, references, and appendix. A general conclusion chapter summarizes the results 
from the three essays. Finally, the 2003 and the 2005 versions of Iowa Lakes Survey which 
are used in the first two essays and the Agricultural Landscape Survey which is used in the 
third essay are included as an appendix to the dissertation.  
1. 3. References 
Azevedo, C. D., K. J. Egan, J. A. Herriges, and C. L. Kling. 2003. “The Iowa Lakes 
Valuation Project: Summary and Findings from Year One.” CARD report.    
Carson, R. T., and T. Groves. 2007. “Incentive and Informational Properties of Preference 
Questions.” Environmental and Resource Economics 37:181-210. 
Zhao, J., and C. L. Kling. 2001. “A New Explanation for the WTP/WTA Disparity.” 
Economic letters 73: 293-300. 
Zhao, J., and C. L. Kling. 2004. “Willingness to Pay, Compensation Valuation, and Cost of 
Commitment.” Economic inquiry 42: 503-17.
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Chapter 2. What are the Consequences of Consequentiality?   
 
2. 1. Introduction 
The question as to the accuracy with which stated preference methods can be used to 
elicit an individual’s values for environmental goods and services continues to be hotly 
debated in the literature. A wide variety of empirical tests have been conducted to date, 
including studies checking for convergent validity with other elicitation methods (e.g., 
revealed preference techniques such as recreation demand or hedonic pricing) or contrasting 
revealed and stated preference responses in an experimental setting. While such tests are 
quite informative, they are often context specific and reduced form in nature, not addressing 
the fundamental issues as to why and under what conditions stated preference methods will 
succeed or fail.  
In contrast, Carson and Groves (2007), by detailing the incentive and informational 
properties of contingent valuation questions, provide the basis for discerning the key 
elements of a successful contingent valuation exercise. Specifically, Carson and Grove argue 
that a respondent can be predicted to answer a dichotomous choice referendum question in a 
manner that is consistent with expected utility maximization if he perceives the survey as 
being “consequential.” That is, if a respondent believes the result of the survey might 
potentially have some influence on an outcome he cares about, he will answer a contingent 
valuation question truthfully since this is his dominant strategy to do so.  
There have been several studies to date testing the “consequentiality” condition and 
its impact on a respondent’s preference revelation by conducting experiments. These 
experimental studies largely take place outside of the context of an actual contingent 
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valuation exercise and require the analyst to inform participants of the degree of 
consequentiality associated with the experiments. These experiments have the important 
advantage that the researcher can directly control the degree of consequentiality, but their 
disadvantage is that this direct control is not typical of contingent valuation surveys. Thus, 
findings from such experiments may be difficult to transfer to the survey arena.  
In this paper, we take a different, but complementary approach, eliciting respondents’ 
perceptions of consequentiality directly in a contingent valuation survey1. Specifically, we 
use respondents’ perceptions of consequentiality elicited in two contingent valuation surveys 
(the 2003 and 2005 versions of the Iowa Lakes Surveys) to determine whether respondents 
have different perceptions concerning the degree of consequentiality of the valuation exercise 
and whether these perceptions affect their willingness to pay (WTP)  in the pattern predicted 
by Carson and Groves (2007).  
In both surveys, respondents were asked whether they would vote in favor of a 
referendum to improve the water quality at a lake where bid values were varied across the 
sample. Respondents were also asked, on a scale from 1 to 5, how likely it was that the 
survey results would influence decisions in the state concerning water quality programs. 
Thus, a measure of the degree to which respondents perceived the survey as consequential 
was directly elicited. Based on the Carson and Groves’s arguments, respondents who do not 
believe that the survey is consequential should be omitted from the sample for estimation 
purposes, since they do not have an incentive to answer the referendum question truthfully. 
Additionally, the distribution of WTP from respondents with different views concerning the 
                                                 
1 Bulte et al. also study consequentiality within a contingent valuation context though they do not elicit 
perceptions of consequentiality from the respondent. 
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degree of consequentiality could be tested for consistency, thereby testing the fundamental 
Carson and Groves’s argument. 
Since respondents who indicate a high degree of consequentiality may do so because 
they place a high value in the proposed water quality improvement project, there is a 
potential endogeniety problem2. To address this concern, a split sample treatment was 
administered in the 2005 survey. Specifically, half of the sample was provided with a 
highlighted article from the Iowa Conservationist—the magazine of the Iowa Department of 
Natural Resources, the state agency with primary responsibility for water quality control—
indicating that Iowa Department of Natural Resources was already using results from the 
survey in their policy decisions and planned to continue to do so (see appendix D of this 
paper). After reading this information, respondents were asked to provide their assessment of 
the degree of consequentiality of the survey. Thus, direct evidence of consequentiality was 
applied to the stratum. This exogenous treatment allows us to separate out the impact of 
consequentiality in the contingent valuation responses which we describe below.  
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of related 
studies in the literature. Section 2.3 describes the Iowa Lakes Project. The model and the 
simulator used to characterize the posterior distribution of the parameters of interests are 
described in section 2.4. Details of the posterior simulator are provided in the Appendix 2.A 
and Appendix 2.B of this paper. A summary in Section 2.5 concludes this paper. 
                                                 
2 We are particularly appreciative to comments from Camp Resource attendees who raised this concern and 
significantly sharpened our thinking concerning the problem. 
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2. 2. Literature Review and Theory 
In exploring why, and under what conditions, a survey respondent is likely to reveal 
his preference, contingent valuation researchers have focused on the incentive and 
informational properties of contingent valuation questions. As Carson and Groves note, a 
consequential contingent valuation question requires that a respondent perceives his answer 
having some influence on the government’s policy decision he cares about. Carson and 
Grove argue that a respondent can be predicted to answer a contingent valuation question in a 
manner consistent with expected utility maximization only if he believes that the result of the 
survey might potentially have some influence on an outcome he cares about. However, if a 
respondent views the survey as being inconsequential, truthful preference revelation is not 
his dominant strategy, since any response has the same influence on his utility. Thus, 
economic theory can say nothing about his preference. A “knife-edge” theoretical result is 
suggested: a respondent who perceives the survey as being somewhat consequential will 
respond to a contingent valuation referendum in the same way as he would to an actual 
referendum regardless of the degree of his perceived consequentiality.  
Several studies have tested the impact of the “consequentiality” condition on 
respondents’ preference revelation. Cummings et al. (1997) conducted an experiment 
involving real and hypothetical referenda to compare how respondents behave in these two 
settings. They find that respondents are more likely to vote “yes” in the hypothetical setting 
than in the real setting and they conclude that hypothetical referenda yield biased estimates of 
WTP. Cummings and Taylor (1998) explore this issue further by investigating how 
hypothetical bias of the dichotomous choice referendum varies with the degree of 
consequentiality. Specifically, their laboratory experiment employs a probabilistic treatment 
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that varies the odds that the referendum will be binding. They find that participants in 
different treatments, including hypothetical, probabilistic, and real referendum, behave 
significantly different. Specifically, the probability of a respondent voting “yes” falls if the 
probability of the referendum being binding rises. They also find that respondents’ voting 
behavior is significantly different from an actual referendum unless there is a high 
probability that the referendum will be binding (e.g., greater than fifty percent).  
Carson et al. (2004) conduct a similar study with a field experiment. In the 
experiment, participants were informed the probability of the dichotomous choice 
referendum being binding. In contrast to Cummings and Taylor (1998), they find the “knife-
edge” theoretical results suggested in Carson and Grove (2007): as long as the probability of 
consequentiality exceeds zero even by a small amount, participants respond the same manner 
as in an actual referendum. They suggest that results from an inconsequential (hypothetical) 
referendum should not be used to make inference about how contingent valuation works in 
consequential referendum.  
Bulte et al. (2005) employ exogenous treatments regarding the incentive and 
informational properties of the survey in split samples to explore the impact of 
consequentiality on respondents’ WTP in a survey setting. In particular, one subsample of 
respondents were informed that the results of the survey will be available to policy makers, 
one subsample of respondents were provided a cheap talk regarding the reasons for strategic 
biases of a hypothetical referendum, and the other respondents received a purely hypothetical 
referendum. Their WTP estimates obtained from the survey with “cheap talk” and the survey 
with a consequentiality device are significantly smaller than those obtained in a purely 
hypothetical survey. In addition, the WTP estimates obtained from the survey with cheap talk 
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are not significantly different from the WTPs obtained from the survey with a consequential 
device.  
2. 3. The Iowa Lakes Project 
This study uses data from two years of the “Iowa Lakes Project,” a four-year study 
and data collection effort aimed at understanding recreational use and the economic value of 
water quality improvement in the principle recreational lakes in the state of Iowa. The project 
began in 2002 with mail surveys sent out to a random sample of 8000 Iowa residents, 
obtaining detailed information regarding their visitation patterns to 132 lakes, as well as 
standard social demographic data such as age, income , gender, education. In subsequent 
years, surveys were sent to those individuals who completed a survey in the prior year.3 
Standard follow-up procedures, including a postcard reminder mailed two weeks after the 
initial mailing and a second copy of the survey mailed one month later, were employed. 
Individuals were provided a $10 incentive for completing the survey.  
A referendum style contingent valuation question was included in the 2003 and the 
2005 versions of the questionnaire.  The contingent valuation question was posed to estimate 
WTP for a water quality improvement project at one of eight focus lakes targeted in the study. 
These lakes were selected in consultation with the Iowa Department of Natural Resources. In 
addition to being geographically dispersed, they are each of policy interest as various 
restoration projects are being considered at the lakes. Each respondent was asked a 
contingent valuation question for only one of the focus lakes. The survey described the 
current water quality information of the lake, including water clarity, watercolor, water odor, 
                                                 
3 A second random sample was added into the panel in 2003 to fill in for the non-deliverable surveys in 2002 
and returned the sample to a total of 8000 individuals. No additional individuals were added after 2003. 
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health concern from algae blooms and bacteria level, and variety and quantity of fish. A 
photograph, which demonstrates the water clarity and watercolor, was provided to help 
respondents picture the water quality of the focus lake vividly.  
Prior to the main valuation question, respondents were reminded with a cheap talk 
essay about the incentive and information properties of the stated preference question in 
further attempt to elicit truthful responses to the contingent valuation question4. Specifically, 
respondents were told: 
“When you think about your answer, it is important to keep in mind that people 
may indicate they would be willing to pay more money when payment is 
hypothetical than when they are immediately expected to pay. It may be easy for 
people to say that they support a project when they are not sure they will ever 
have to pay any money based on their response. However, if the proposed 
payments are real and immediate, people may be more inclined to think about 
other options and what they would have to give up to make the payment. So in 
answering the following questions, please keep in mind both the benefits of the 
water quality improvement and the impact that passage of such a referendum 
would have on your finances. In other words, please answer as if this were a real 
referendum.” 
A water quality improvement project regarding the focus lake was then proposed that 
outlined the methods to achieve the water quality improvement at each lake, such as dredging 
and building protection strips around the perimeter. Respondents were then asked whether 
they would vote in favor of the referendum to improve the lake where bid values were varied 
across the sample of Iowan receiving the survey5. Finally, the perceived consequentiality of 
the survey was elicited from respondents by asking the following question: 
“How likely do you think it is that the results of surveys such as the one will affect 
decisions about water quality in Iowa lakes?”  
                                                 
4 See the NOAA Panel Guidelines and Cummings and Taylor (1998). 
5 See the contingent valuation question associated with one of the focus lakes in Appendix C. 
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Possible responses to this question ranged from 1 to 5 where a “1” denoted “no effect at all” 
(i.e., completely inconsequential) and “5” denoted “definite” effect. 
Of the 7720 deliverable copies of 2003 Iowa Lakes Survey, there was a 68% response 
rate. 465 observations were eliminated for missing values in their votes on the hypothetical 
referendum or their perceptions of consequentiality. In total, 4784 observations were used in 
this study.  
Table 2.1 lists a summary of the 2003 data across consequential groups. In our sample, 
the more consequential the respondents view the survey, the higher the observed “yes” rate to 
the proposed referendum. The “yes” rate rises from 13% for respondents who believe the 
survey is inconsequential to 38% for respondents who believe the survey is definitely 
consequential. Also of note, respondents who do not visit the lakes tend to view the survey 
inconsequential. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the voting patterns of respondents who report different levels of 
consequentiality across the bid values. Overall, the voting patterns of respondents who report 
any positive degree of consequentiality, i.e., anyone who reports a “2”, “3”, “4”, or “5” to the 
consequentiality question, is consistent with economic theory: the “yes” rate falls as the bid 
value rises. In this sample, it is also the case that the “yes” rate of the inconsequential group 
is lower than that of consequential group at each bid value.  
Recall that Carson and Grove’s “knife-edge” result states that respondents’ votes on 
the contingent valuation question will be the same as an actual referendum as long as the 
respondents perceive positive chance that the survey is consequential. This suggests that 
respondents who report any positive degree of perceived consequentiality should generate 
WTP values from the same distribution—their true preferences.  
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Table 2.1 Selected Data Summary by Consequentiality Level (2003 sample) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
N 307 832 1995 1294 356 
% YES 0.13 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.38 
% Not Visited 0.48 0.32 0.29 0.24 0.22 
% Male 0.70 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.65 
% College 0.55 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.64 
Age 58.31 
(16.41) 
53.42 
(15.85) 
53.22 
(15.61) 
51.29 
(15.27) 
55.51 
(16.73) 
Income ($1,000) 54.1 
(40.7) 
58.8 
(37.8) 
55.9 
(34.7) 
58.2 
(38.1) 
49.4 
(37.3) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 “Yes” Rate of Respondents with Different Beliefs of Consequentiality (2003 Survey) 
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To examine this conjecture, we could estimate a WTP function for each level of 
reported consequentiality and test whether the distributions are statistically different from 
one another. However, there is the potential endogeniety of respondents’ responses to the 
consequentiality question6. In particular, respondents who have a high WTP may believe the 
survey is consequential due to the importance of the project. Likewise, respondents who 
indicated a low degree of consequentiality may do so because they place a low value in the 
proposed water quality improvement project. 
To control for the potential endogeniety, a split sample treatment was randomly 
administered in the 2005 Iowa Lakes survey. We took advantage of a magazine article and a 
letter from the director of the Iowa Department of Natural Resources that had recently been 
published concerning how results from earlier years of the study were being used by the 
department to prioritize water quality improvement projects. Specifically, half of the sample 
was provided with a copy of the director’s letter and an article from the Iowa Conservationist 
indicating that the Iowa Department of Natural Resources was already using results from the 
surveys in their policy decisions and planned to continue to do so. This information was also 
highlighted in the cover letter to the respondents7. Thus, direct evidence of consequentiality 
was applied to the stratum. The exogenous treatment to respondents’ perception of 
consequentiality allows us to separate out the impact of consequentiality in the contingent 
valuation responses. Appendix D of this paper contains some of the relevant text and 
information respondents were sent.  
                                                 
6 Since the 2003 Iowa Lakes Survey resulted in an overall “yes” response rate that, we included additional 
lower bid values in the 2005 survey. Specifically, for half of the 2003 sample, the 2003 bid values were 
reduced by a factor of ten. The remainder of the sample received the same bids as they received in 2003. 
7 Permission from the DNR and Director’s office was obtained prior to survey implementation. 
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The 2005 Iowa Lakes surveys were sent to a random sample of 2859 Iowa residents8. 
The same standard follow-up procedures, including a postcard reminder mailed two weeks 
after the initial mailing and a second copy of the survey mailed one month later, were 
followed. Of the 2611 deliverable surveys, there was an 85% response rate. 211 respondents 
were eliminated for missing values in their votes on the hypothetical referendum or their 
perception of consequentiality. In total, 1996 observations were used in this study. 
Table 2.2 lists a summary of the 2005 data across consequential groups. Due to the 
additional lower bid values applied in 2005 survey, there is a significant increase in the 
overall “yes” rate. Further, similar to the voting pattern shown in Table 2.1, the more 
consequential the respondents view the survey, the higher the observed “yes” rate to the 
proposed referendum. The “yes” rate rises from 23% for respondents who believe the survey 
is inconsequential to 48% for respondents who believe the survey is definitely consequential.  
Table 2.2 Selected Data Summary by Consequentiality Level (2005 sample) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
N 83 266 782 689 176 
% YES 0.23 0.42 0.47 0.53 0.48 
% Not Visited 0.50 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.26 
% Male 0.53 0.69 0.64 0.66 0.61 
% College 0.33 0.42 0.41 0.49 0.37 
Age 58.05 
(16.60) 
56.71 
(15.62) 
54.72 
(15.31) 
53.73 
(14.35) 
57.71 
(14.98) 
Income ($1,000) 54.00 
(38.64) 
63.43 
(37.28) 
63.75 
(38.12) 
64.95 
(37.38) 
59.30 
(41.07) 
 
                                                 
8 Observations from one of the eight focus were eliminated for there were an on going restoration project. In 
addition, observations from other three of the eight focus lakes were used as part of a different study. Thus, 
only respondents who responded four of the eight lakes were provided the exogenous treatment and were used 
in the 2005 study.   
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Table 2.3 reveals respondents’ perception of consequentiality toward the 2005 survey. About 
4% of respondents view the survey as inconsequential (response of a “1”), 87 % of 
respondents view the survey as probably consequential (response of a “2,” “3,” or “4”), and 
9% of respondents view the survey as definitely consequential (response of a “5”). As also 
shown in the table, our treatment has a small, but positive influence on respondents’ 
perceptions of consequentiality toward the survey. Respondents who receive the treatment 
are more likely to view the survey as consequential. 
 
Table 2.3. Comparison of Respondents with and without Treatment 
(Number of Observations in Parentheses) 
 1 2 3 4 5 N 
Whole Sample 0.04 
(83) 
0.13 
(266) 
0.39 
(782) 
0.35 
(689) 
0.09 
(176) 
1996 
With Treatment 0.04 
(36) 
0.13 
(127) 
0.38 
(388) 
0.36 
(361) 
0.10 
(97) 
1009 
Without Treatment 0.05 
(47) 
0.14 
(139) 
0.40 
(394) 
0.33 
(328) 
0.08 
(79) 
987 
 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the patterns of “yes” response rates in the 2005 survey which are 
similar to those observed in 2003 survey.  Specifically, a clear trend of decreasing “yes” rates 
as the bid value rises is observed for the groups of respondents who indicated positive degree 
of consequentiality (responses of “2”, “3”, “4”, or “5”).  As observed in the 2003 survey, the 
“yes” rate amongst the inconsequential group is lower than that of consequential groups even 
in lower bid values.  
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Figure 2.2. “Yes” Rate of Respondents with Different Beliefs of Consequentiality (2005 Survey) 
 
2. 4. Model and Empirical Results 
An exogenous treatment is employed to control for the potential endogeniety. We 
applied a Bayesian treatment effect model to jointly estimate respondents’ WTP and 
perceptions of consequentiality. Details of the employed models and estimation results along 
with related discussion are provided in the following subsections 
2. 4. 1. Three-group Estimation 
To formally test the effects of consequentiality on WTP, we consider the following 
two equation triangular model: 
 *i ci c ic ε= +x β  (2.1) 
 * ii wi w c iw u= + +x cβ δ  (2.2) 
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where 
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x x  
Equation (1) corresponds to the “consequentiality” equation, while equation (2) corresponds 
to the “willingness to pay” equation. The latent variables, *ic  and 
*
iw , are not observed, but 
their values generate an observed consequentiality  variable ic  and an observed binary 
willingness to pay indicator iw . We thus relate the observables ic  and iw  to their latent 
variables as follows: 
 
*
*
*
3*
*
3
1    if 0
1    if 
2    if 0   
0    if 
3    if  
i
i i
i i i
i i
i
c
w B
w c c
w B
c
α
α
⎧ −∞ < ≤⎪⎧ ≥⎪ ⎪= = < ≤⎨ ⎨<⎪ ⎪⎩ < ≤ ∞⎪⎩
 
where iB  is the bid value proposed to individual i and ic in (2) is a 1/3 vector with a “1” in 
the thic column and zeroes elsewhere. We are primarily interested in the coefficients cδ , 
which describe the “causal” impacts of various degrees of consequentiality on WTP. Of 
course, the instrument is included in cix without loss of generality.  
The system of two equations contains an ordered probit model, described by equation 
(2.1), and a standard probit model, described by equation (2.2). At present, an ordered probit 
with only three possible values implying only one unknown cutpoint is considered. This 
limiting assumption is adopted for ease of initial estimation, and we will relax this restriction 
in next section.  
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In practice, it can be difficult to estimate the cutpoints in this system. It has been well-
documented in the literature that the standard ordered probit Gibbs sampler (e.g., Albert and 
Chib, 1993) in these types of models can suffer from slow mixing, particular in large data 
sets, motivating the need to implement some type of reparameterization or blocking step. 
Here, we introduce a reparameterization, following the suggestion of Nandram and Chan 
(1996), which will avoid these problems. Specifically, let 13γ α −=   and define the notation 
x xγ= .  That is, the . notation simply denotes the operation of taking the original variable 
and multiplying it by γ .  Multiplying (2.1) by γ  and adjusting the rule mapping the latent c* 
into the observed c produces the following observationally equivalent model: 
  *i ici cc ε= +x β  (2.3) 
 * ii wi w c iw u= + +x cβ δ  (2.4) 
where 
 
 2
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| , ~ ,
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iidi cw
ci wi
i cw w
N
u
γ γσε
γσ σ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
x x  
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We choose to work with the parameters: 
 
~' ' ' andw cc
⎡ ⎤= Σ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦β β β δ , 
rather than the original parameterization of the model. The primary reasons for doing this are: 
(1) the reparameterization helps to improve the mixing of the posterior simulation, (2) the 
reparameterization eliminates one component of the cutpoint, and finally, (3) the 
reparameterization eliminates the diagonal restriction on the 2x2 covariance matrix, which 
enables the application of a standard Wishart prior on 
1~−Σ . Since the structural parameters 
2
3,  ,  ,  and c cw wβ σ σ α are ultimately of interest, we can recover these by using the 
appropriate inverse transformations: 
 
 ~ ~ 3
3,  ,  and 
cwc
c cw
σ ασ αγ γ γ= = =
ββ  
Using the model described and the algorithm documented in the appendix, we run our 
posterior simulator for 55000 simulations, and discard the first 5000 iterations as burn-in. 
Generated experiments revealed that our algorithm mixed well and consistently recovered 
parameters of the data generating process in samples of a similar size and in a variety of 
experimental designs.  
In our data, ic  takes on five different ordered values, ranging from regarding the 
survey as being completely irrelevant to the making of ( 1ic = ) to regarding policy the survey 
as having a definite impact on government policy ( 5ic = ). Table 2.4 reports results from an 
application of the model when the three order choices model in the consequentiality equation 
are {1, (2, 3) or (4, 5)}. That is, respondents who answered “2” and “3”, or “4” and “5” are  
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Table 2.4. Posterior Means, Standard Deviations and Probabilities of Being Positive  
(Three-Group Estimation) 
Consequentiality, {1, (2, 3), (4, 5)} 
Variable ( )|E y⋅  ( )|Std y⋅  ( )Pr 0 | y⋅ >  
Iowa Conservationist Article 1.64 0.06 1.00 
Treatment 0.10 0.05 0.98 
Age -0.03 0.03 0.10 
Income -0.01 0.03 0.36 
Female -0.05 0.05 0.18 
College 0.15 0.06 1.00 
Willingness to Pay, {1, (2, 3), (4, 5)} 
Intercept (N = 83) 2.80 0.53 1.00 
Group 2 (N = 266) 1.39 0.44 1.00 
Group 3 (N = 1647) 1.34 0.76 0.96 
Age 0.11 0.10 0.87 
Income 0.46 0.11 1.00 
Female 0.41 0.20 0.98 
College 0.78 0.21 1.00 
Variance, Covariance, and Cutpoint 
2
wσ  10.34 2.00 - 
cwρ  0.11 0.10 0.87 
3α  1.91 0.05 - 
Difference between Group 2 and Group 3 
3 2δ δ−  -0.05 0.50 0.46 
 
treated as if they are in the same group. To study the sensitivity of our findings to this 
specific choice of aggregating the five responses into three, we also estimate the model with 
two other choice groupings: {1, (2, 3, 4), 5)} and {1, 2, (3, 4, 5)}. The qualitative results are 
quite consistent across the specifications, so we report results for the first grouping only. 
The consequentiality equation contains an intercept, a dummy variable indicating 
whether the respondent received the treatment (the copy of the Iowa Conservationist and the 
letter from the director), the standardized age of the respondent, standardized income level of 
the respondent, the gender of the respondent (female =1), and whether the respondent is a 
college graduate. The first column of the table reports the posterior mean, the second column 
reports the posterior standard deviation and the final column reports the probability that the 
 23
parameter value is positive. Values in the final column near either 1 or 0 indicate a high 
likelihood of difference from zero, the former in the positive direction, and the latter in the 
negative. 
The estimates from the consequentiality equation suggest that the treatment effect has 
its desired effect: all else equal, respondents who received the treatment report a higher level 
of consequentiality than those who do not with 98% likelihood that the value is positive. 
While encouraging, it is important to point out that the effect is quite small. Age and college 
education also appear to influence the likelihood that respondents view the survey as 
consequential. 
Should the respondents’ WTP be non-negative, we assume the relationship between 
their WTP and their characteristics is log-linear (meaning that we replace iB  with ( )log iB  in 
the estimation process). The log WTP equation contains an intercept (a response of 1ic = , 
the base category), two categorical dummies, and socioeconomic characteristics included in 
the consequentiality equation. We treat a response of 1ic =  is viewed as the “base category”, 
therefore, all the other elements of 'cδ  are interpreted relative to this base group.  
The estimates from the willingness to pay equation suggest that the difference in the 
mean log WTP between the consequentiality group {2, 3} and consequentiality group 1 is 
1.39 with 100% probability of that difference being positive. The difference in the mean log 
WTP between the consequentiality group {4, 5} and consequentiality group 1 is 1.34 with 
96% probability of that difference being positive. In addition, female, older respondents, and 
those with college education and with higher income are more willing to pay for a given 
water quality improvement.  
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The primary interest of this paper is to test whether individuals respond in the same 
manner as long as the respondents perceive the survey as consequential. One of the 
advantages of Bayesian analysis via sampling methods is that it is often straightforward to 
examine the degree of correlation between model parameters. In our case, the posterior 
probability of difference in the mean log WTP between the consequentiality group {2, 3} and 
{4, 5} is -0.05 with a 46% probability of that difference being positive. As shown in Table 2. 
5, the WTP distribution of consequentiality group {2, 3} is similar to that of consequentiality 
group {4, 5}.   
 
Table 2.5. Posterior Predictive WTP Statistics across Consequentiality Groups 
 ( )( )E E WTP  ( )( )E Std WTP  ( )( )E Med WTP  
WTP 2 105.11 2.00 91.75 
WTP 3 103.92 2.04 93.80 
 
Also of interest is to assess the correlation between the two equations error terms, ε  
and u , since suspected correlation between these two terms is what gives rise to the need to 
jointly estimate the model parameters. Our result suggests that there is a 0.11 correlation 
between respondents’ perception of consequentiality and WTP with an 87% chance that the 
correlations are positive. 
2. 4. 2. Five-Group Estimation 
To fix the case considering five ordered values, the same model is used and the rule 
mapping the latent c* into the observed c is adjusted accordingly. Specifically, the model 
including reparameterization and a Metropolis-Hasting step, which is described in the 
appendix, is written as 
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  *i ici cc ε= +x β  (2.5) 
 * ii wi w c iw u= + +x cβ δ  (2.6) 
where 
 
 2
2
0
| , ~ ,
0
iidi cw
ci wi
i cw w
N
u
γ γσε
γσ σ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
x x  
 
*
*
3*
*
3 4*
*
4
*
1    if 0
2    if 0   
1    if 
3    if 
0    if 
4    if 1  
5    if 1    
i
i
i i
i i i
i i
i
i
c
c
w B
w c c
w B
c
c
α
α α
α
⎧ −∞ < ≤⎪⎪ < ≤⎪⎧ ≥⎪ ⎪= =⎨ ⎨ < ≤<⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎪ < ≤⎪⎪ < ≤ ∞⎩





 
We choose to work with the parameters: 
 ~ ~ ~' ' ' 3 4, ,  and w cc α α
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= Σ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
β β β δ  
and we can recover these parameters of interests by using the appropriate inverse 
transformations: 
 i i i3 4 1,  ,  and cwcc cw σ α ασγ γ γ γ γ
⎡ ⎤= = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
ββ . 
Using the model described, we run our posterior simulator for 3000 simulations, and 
discard the first 1000 as burn-in. Generated experiments revealed that our algorithm mixed 
well and consistently recovered parameters of the data generating process in samples of a 
similar size and in a variety of experimental designs. For our priors, we set β = 0μ , 
( )2100 kβ = IV , 5v =  and 2=R I . 
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The estimates from the five-group model are similar to those from the three-group 
model. As shown in Table 2.6, the estimates from the consequentiality equation suggest that 
respondents who received the treatment report a higher level of consequentiality than those 
who did not We treat a response of 5ic =  is viewed as the “base category”, therefore, all the 
other elements of 'cδ  are interpreted relative to this base group. The estimates from the 
willingness to pay equation suggest that respondents who perceive the survey as 
consequential tend to have a higher WTP. Regarding to the respondents’ social economic 
characteristics, female, older respondents, and those with college education and higher  
 
Table 2.6. Posterior Means, Standard Deviations and Probabilities of Being Positive 
 (Five-Group Estimation) 
Consequentiality Equation 
Variables  ( )|E y⋅  ( )|Std y⋅  ( )Pr 0 | y⋅ >  
Intercept   1.67 0.13 1.00 
Iowa Conservationist Article 0.10 0.04 0.99 
Age -0.01 0.02 0.18 
Income -0.00 0.01 0.42 
Female 0.00 0.05 0.51 
College 0.07 0.05 0.89 
Willingness to Pay Equation 
Intercept  (N = 176) 2.96 0.80 1.00 
Group 4 (N = 689) 0.33 0.51 0.74 
Group 3 (N = 782) -0.11 0.78 0.44 
Group 2 (N = 266) -0.51 1.07 0.33 
Group 1 (N = 83) -2.23 1.46 0.05 
Age  0.09 0.07 0.90 
Income 0.13 0.03 1.00 
Female 0.39 0.21 0.98 
College 0.74 0.21 1.00 
Covariance Matrix Parameters and Cutpoints 
2
wσ  10.89 2.29 - 
cwρ  0.10 0.07 0.92 
3α  0.51 0.03 - 
4α  1.45 0.04 - 
5α  2.38 0.04 - 
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income are more willing to pay for a given water quality improvement. In addition, the 
correlation between the two equations error terms, ε  and u , is 0.01 with only about an 92% 
chance that the correlations are positive with 99% likelihood that the value is positive. 
College education also appears to influence the likelihood that respondents view the survey 
as consequential. 
Since the parameters capture the causal effect of consequentiality perceptions on 
WTP, other things equal, the posterior probability of difference in the mean WTP among the 
consequentiality groups may be viewed as a test of the theory. Specifically, we calculate the 
posterior probability of the form ( ) { }Pr  , 1, 2,3,4,5cj ck j kδ δ> ∀ ∈ . It is obvious, from Table 2. 
7, that the subgroup who perceives the survey as inconsequential has a lower WTP than those 
who view the survey as somewhat consequential and those who view the survey as definitely 
consequential. In addition, the consequentiality groups “2”, “3”, ”4” and “5” have 
statistically indistinguishable distributions of WTP.  
 
Table 2.7. Posterior Probabilities and Posterior Predictive WTP statistics  
 Consequentiality Response 
 1 2 3 4 5 
( )5Pr |c yδ > ⋅ - - - - - 
( )4Pr |c yδ > ⋅ - - - - 0.74 
( )3Pr |c yδ > ⋅ - - - 0.12 0.44 
( )2Pr |c yδ > ⋅ - - 0.16 0.11 0.33 
( )1Pr |c yδ > ⋅  - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Median WTP 14.05 84.22 127.06 207.10 142.51 
Mean WTP 19.88 93.91 130.58 220.47 184.47 
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2. 5. Final Remarks 
Carson and Grove (2007) argue that respondents who view a contingent valuation 
survey as being consequential should truthfully reveal their preferences, implying that their 
responses to the contingent valuation question can be analyzed economically. If a contingent 
valuation survey is not viewed as being consequential, they argue that economic theory can 
say nothing about the interpretation of the responses. In this study, we employ data from the 
2003 and 2005 versions of Iowa Lakes Survey to examine the effect of consequentiality on 
respondents’ WTP.  The respondents’ degree of perceived consequentiality was directly 
elicited as part of the contingent valuation instrument.  
To detect the potential endogeniety of consequentiality, we implemented a split 
sample treatment in one of the survey years. An article from the Iowa Conservationist was 
provided to half of the sample as an exogenous instrument, which indicates that the Iowa 
Department of Natural Resources was already using results from the surveys in their policy 
decisions, and planned to continue to do so. This exogenous instrument potentially allows us 
to separate out the impact of consequentiality in the contingent valuation responses. 
While much additional work remains to be done using these data, several interesting 
findings have emerged. First, respondents report a wide range of perception concerning the 
degree to which the basic survey instrument is likely to influence actual decision making. 
However, most respondents view the survey as having at least some positive probability of 
influencing policy. Second, the degree to which respondents perceive the survey instrument 
as being consequential can be influenced by an exogenous treatment such as the one 
implemented here. However, the effect of that treatment, while statistically identifiable, was 
quite small. A third finding from the jointly estimated WTP/consequentiality model is that 
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the mean WTP of the respondents who report a somewhat positive level of consequentiality 
is not significantly different from those who report a value of “5”. 
Finally, these results and findings suggest that more work needs to be done to 
understand the way in which respondents determine whether a survey is consequential. The 
consequentiality equation estimated suggests that the instruments employed here provide 
little explanatory power. If the consequentialness of a survey instrument is destined to 
become an important criterion in evaluating the reliability of WTP estimates, a better 
understanding of its facets is needed. 
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Appendix 2.A Three-Group Bayesian Estimation 
Priors and the Joint Posterior 
The augmented posterior distribution involves adding the latent 
*
c  and *w  to the 
joint posterior distribution. Under prior independence, the joint distribution can be 
represented as: 
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where the product term follows from the assumed conditional independence across 
observations. For the first term on the right-hand side of the product, note 
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Apart from the priors, the remaining pieces in our joint posterior follow immediately from 
our normality assumption: 
 ~ ~* *, | ~ ,
iid
ci c
i i
wi w i c
c w N
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤Σ Σ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
x β
β,
x β cδ
  
The model is completed by choosing priors of the forms: 
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 ( )~ ,N βββ Vμ  
( )1~ ~ ,W v−Σ R  
where β = 0μ , ( )2100 kβ = IV , 5v =  and 2=R I . 
The Gibbs Sampling Algorithm 
As is well known in the literature, the standard Gibbs sampler in ordered outcome 
analysis can suffer form slow mixing. We use the reparameterization method in our posterior 
simulator to mitigate the slow mixing problem. The Gibbs sampler proceeds in four steps: 
Step 1. Drawing from 
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Step 3. Drawing from 
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Similar to a SUR model, we obtain 
 ( )~ * *| , ,V βΣ, β βc w ,c,w ~ N  
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in the SUR model, we obtain 
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A Gibbs sampler proceeds by simulating (in order) from those posterior conditional 
distribution. 
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Appendix 2.B Five-Group Bayesian Estimation 
Priors and the Joint Posterior 
We fit the model using a Gibbs sampler with the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm 
suggested by Cowles (1996). The augmented posterior distribution involves adding the latent 
*
c  and *w  to the joint posterior distribution. Under prior independence, the joint distribution 
can be represented as: 
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where the product term follows from the assumed conditional independence across 
observations. For the first term on the right-hand side of the product, note 
  
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Apart from the priors, the remaining pieces in our joint posterior follow immediately from 
our normality assumption: 
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The model is completed by choosing priors of the forms: 
 ( )~ ,N βββ Vμ  
( )1~ ~ ,W v−Σ R  
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
3 4 3 3 3 4~
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1| 0 1 1
1
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α  
where β = 0μ , ( )2100 kβ = IV , 5v =  and 2=R I . For the last of these priors, we impose the 
ordering restriction on the cutpoints. Unconditionally, we specify a prior for the smallest 
transformed cutpoint, 
~
3α  which is uniform over its support, while ~ 4α  is specified to be 
conditionally uniform over (
~
3α , 1). 
The Metropolis-Hasting Step 
As is well known in the literature, the standard Gibbs sampler in ordered outcome 
analysis can suffer form slow mixing. We use the reparameterization method and a 
Metropolis-Hasting step in our posterior simulator to mitigate the slow mixing problem.  
First, note that 
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Since the cutpoint i 3α  and i 4α  are only involved in the above expression for i such that 
{ }2,3, 4ic ∈ , we can write 
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Though routines for directly calculating joint probabilities like those above are often not 
available in standard software packages, files for calculating the bivariate normal cdf are 
often available. To make use of such routine to calculate the above, we first let cw cw wρ σ σ=  
and define the standard bivariate cdf notation: 
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where  1Z and 2Z are univariate normal variables with zero mean, unit variances, and 
correlation coefficient ρ . Since  
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The conditional posterior above is not a recognizable form, and thus we employ a 
Metropolis-Hasting (M-H) step for sampling from 
~ ~
| , , ,p ⎛ ⎞Σ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠α β c w . Specifically, building 
upon the idea of Cowles (1996), we make use of a random-walk type chain which 
incorporates the ordering and truncation restrictions on the elements of 
~α . 
To this end, we let  ( )1t−α denote the current value of the chain. Implementation of the M-H 
step requires the specification of a proposal density, which we denote as   ( )( )1| tq −α α . This 
proposal density governs the likelihood of movement to   ( )t=α α  given that the chain is 
currently at  ( )1t−α . For this application, we choose 
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In other words, we decompose our transition kernel into a marginal for 
~
3α  and a conditional 
for 
~
4α  given ~ 3α  where both are conditional on the current value of the chain, 
( )1~ t−α . With 
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this choice of proposal density, we sample  candα  from   ( )( )1| tq −α α  and accept  candα  as a draw 
from the conditional with probability: 

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where the target and proposal density ordinates and the form of the transition kernel 
described above. If the candidate draw is not accepted, we set the current value of the chain 
equals to its previous value, i.e.,   ( )1t−=α α . In practice we set 1 2 0.01d d= = , which produced 
reasonable acceptance rates (near 40 percent) and also seemed to perform well in generated 
data experiments.  
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Appendix 2.C Contingent Valuation Section in Iowa Lakes Survey 
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Appendix 2.D Treatment in Iowa Lakes Survey 2005 
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Chapter 3. The Dynamic Formation of Willingness to Pay: the Impact of 
Delay, Learning, and Reversing in Contingent Valuation  
3. 1. Introduction  
The contingent valuation method (CVM) uses survey questions to elicit individuals’ 
preferences for nonmarket goods. Respondents in a contingent valuation survey are given a 
scenario describing a proposed policy that would alter the quantity or quality of a public 
good and asked questions to elicit their maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to obtain the 
specified improvements. Typically, a respondent’s WTP in a contingent valuation exercise is 
assumed to depend on some intrinsic value of the good that is invariant over time. Yet, as 
Zhao and Kling (2001, 2004) point out, that time (and the potential options it creates) does 
matter. Specifically, the individuals’ WTP for a good at a particular point of time depends 
not only on the intrinsic value of the good, but also on the timing of the decision and the 
characteristics of the market environment.  
Suppose, for example, that there is a lake restoration project under consideration and 
researchers wish to assess the welfare implication using a contingent valuation referendum in 
which respondents make decisions regarding their preference for the proposed project. In 
particular, a contingent valuation referendum may ask “would you vote ‘yes’ to the 
referendum to improve the water quality to the level as described here? The proposed project 
would cost you $X.” Faced with this question, and any uncertainty they may have, the 
respondents may be influenced by the possibility of acquiring more information in the future 
that will help them make better decisions. If respondents believe that there is at least positive 
probability that the project will be proposed again in the future, so that their decision for the 
project can be delayed, their WTP to commit to decision today is likely to be reduced. 
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Furthermore, the decisions to whether the proposed changes are usually irreversible. Yet, if 
the government would be willing to cancel an ineffective project, respondents may perceive 
positive transaction costs incurred in terminating it. Again, respondents prefer to delay their 
decisions, allowing more information to be gathered regarding the efficiency of the proposed 
project, and report a lower WTP for the project today. 
 Zhao and Kling (2004) provide a dynamic model for understanding individuals’ 
decisions to purchase or to sell a good under conditions of uncertainty, learning, and 
irreversibility. With limited information and limited ability of learning and reversal, 
individuals’ implied welfare measure of the transaction decision contains (a) the expected 
intrinsic value of the good as typically conceived of in empirical welfare analysis and (b) the 
compensation associated with the timing of the transaction decision. Zhao and Kling refer to 
the latter as the commitment cost, which is related to but distinct from the quasi-option value 
demonstrated by Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), Hanemann (1989), and Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994). The commitment cost theory predicts that individuals would prefer to delay 
their transaction decision and reveal a lower WTP, if they expect (a) that delaying the 
decision is possible, (b) that learning more information in the future is possible, and (c) that 
reversing the decision is difficult. In other words, when delaying the decision is possible, 
individuals’ decisions may depend on the value of the information. If individuals are well 
informed of the project, or if individuals do not expect to obtain more information in the 
future, they may have less incentive to delay their decision and may ask lower compensation 
for committing the payment now. Furthermore, when delaying the decision is possible, if 
individuals perceive high transaction cost of reversing a bad decision, they may prefer to 
delay the decisions and may ask higher compensation for committing the payment now.  
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If the intertemporal aspects of the contingent valuation referendum influence 
respondents’ decision and the reported WTP as the commitment cost theory predicts, the 
researchers should carefully convey not only the attributes of the project, but also the 
potential for delay, learning, and reversal in their stated preference surveys. For example, if 
uncertainty, learning, and irreversibility are inherent in the proposed project, then the 
commitment cost should be part of the WTP elicited from respondents in a stated preference 
survey. Without revealing the potential for delay, learning, and reversal in survey instruments, 
respondents may ignore the commitment cost and the researcher may overestimate 
respondents’ WTP. On the other hand, if the researcher is interested in respondents’ WTP for 
the proposed project with no opportunity to revisit the project or to reverse the decision at a 
later date, then the commitment cost is policy irrelevant. In this case, the immediacy of the 
decision should be communicated in the survey instrument; otherwise, respondents may 
perceive positive potential for delay, learning, and reversal. As a result, respondents may 
include the commitment cost in their valuation yielding a WTP that underestimates the value 
of the project given the current information.  
The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of delay, learning, and 
irreversibility on respondents’ decisions and their implied welfare measure in a contingent 
valuation referendum. It is shown that the intertemporal aspects of the contingent valuation 
referendum do indeed influence the respondents’ voting behavior and, hence, their implied 
WTP. Thus, researchers need to be careful in reflecting the information regarding the 
dynamic aspects of the proposed referendum in survey instruments. 
In this paper, we use responses of contingent valuation referendums from the 2003 
and 2005 versions of the Iowa Lakes Survey to examine the effects of the dynamic aspects on 
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respondents’ votes to the referendums. First, in the 2003 version of survey, we use a split 
sample treatment to test the effect of delay on respondents’ WTP. Specifically, half of our 
2003 sample was promised a definite opportunity to vote on the same referendum two years 
later in the 2005 version of the survey. With the explicit statement of delay, we expect to 
separate out the impact of delay on WTP.  
Second, we use respondents’ self-reported perceptions for delay, learning, and 
reversal elicited from the 2003 version of survey to examine the effects of these dynamic 
aspects on their WTP. In particular, we asked respondents who were not promised a second 
chance to vote on the referendum to indicate their perceptions regarding the potential for 
delay, learning, and reversal. We then investigate the linkage between these perceptions and 
the respondents’ reported WTP.  
Third, we examine the impact of delay with another perspective in the 2005 version 
of survey. In the 2005 version of survey, half of the sample was notified the immediacy of 
the lake restoration project. We use this split sample treatment to examine the impact of the 
immediacy on WTP.  
Finally, Zhao and Kling argue that the commitment cost itself depends on the 
potential for additional learning foregone due to the commitment. If respondents were 
already well informed about the good or if they did not expect to learn more information, 
then they would have less incentive to delay their decision and would ask less compensation 
for forgoing their opportunity for delay (i.e., have a lower commitment cost). In the 2005 
version of survey, we elicited from each survey respondent their knowledge about the general 
water quality in Iowa lakes and the perceptions regarding the potential for delay. These data 
are used to examine the impact of knowledge perception on individuals’ WTP. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief review of empirical 
studies related to the commitment cost theory. Section 3.3 describes the Iowa Lakes Project 
and the data used in this study. Our empirical results are provided in Section 3.4. Discussion 
and conclusions follow in section 3.5. 
3. 2. Empirical Literature on Commitment Cost  
There have been relatively few empirical investigations into the role of commitment 
costs in the estimation of WTP. Results from a field experiment in an actual sports card 
marketplace conducted by Kling, List, and Zhao (2003) conform to the predictions of the 
commitment cost theory. In particular, the WTP for sports cards increases when the buyers 
perceive increasing difficulty of delay and a decreasing difficulty of reversing the transaction. 
Conversely, WTA decreases when sellers perceive a decreasing difficulty of delay and an 
increasing difficulty of transaction reversal.  
Both Lusk (2003) and Corrigan (2005) explore this issue in experimental auctions. 
Lusk (2003) explicitly controlled the experiment with different possibilities for delay, future 
learning, and reversal. Specifically, the values of coffee mugs and a lottery with various 
degrees of uncertainty were elicited via second price auctions in the experiment. The 
experiment consisted of one-period auction, two-period auction, and two-period auction with 
a return policy. The results from the coffee mug auctions provide a weak test of the 
commitment cost theory due to the inability to control the uncertainty about the value of the 
coffee mugs and the potential for resale (i.e., in the decision reversal portion of Lusk’s study). 
On the other hand, the lottery provided a better test of the theory, with a convenient way to 
characterize uncertainty regarding the value of the lottery and with no market for the lottery 
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outside the experiment. Lusk (2003) provided little support for the commitment cost theory. 
In particular, the theory’s prediction that WTP decreases with the potential for future learning 
is supported in the lottery auction, but not in the coffee mug auction. However, neither 
auction supported the prediction that the individual’s WTP increases when the decision can 
be reversed. Lastly, contrary to the theory, the experiment result did not support the theory’s 
prediction that WTP increases when the respondent is more certain about the value of the 
good.   
Instead of controlling the possibility of the dynamic aspects, Corrigan (2005) used 
similar goods in an experimental auction and elicited individuals’ perceptions regarding the 
relative difficulty of reversal and delay outside the experimental market. Contrary to the 
results in Lusk (2003), he found that individuals’ perceptions of the dynamic aspects 
influence their WTP in a manner consistent with the commitment cost theory.   
Finally, Corrigan, Kling, and Zhao (2008) examine the dynamic nature of WTP in a 
contingent valuation study concerned with cleaning up a local lake. Specifically, two 
versions of survey instruments were used to test whether individuals who were promised a 
second chance to vote on the referendum one year later are less willing to vote “yes” to the 
referendum than individuals who were given no opportunity for delay. Their results indicate 
that when individuals are explicitly offered the opportunity to delay their decision, the 
resulting WTP is significantly less than when there is no opportunity for delay. In addition, 
the commitment cost, measured as the difference between a WTP with and without delay, 
can be substantial. While the results of Corrigan, Kling, and Zhao (2008) provide some 
empirical support to the commitment cost theory when the potential for delay is directly 
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controlled, they do not investigate the role of either information or decision reversal on 
individuals’ WTP. 
3. 3. The Iowa Lakes Project  
The data used in this study come from two years of the “Iowa Lakes Project,” a four-
year study aimed at understanding recreational use and the value of water quality in the 
principle recreational lakes in the state of Iowa. The project began in 2002 with mail surveys 
sent to a random sample of 8000 Iowa residents, obtaining detailed information regarding 
their visitation patterns to 132 Iowa lakes as well as standard demographic data such as age, 
income, gender, education. In subsequent years, surveys were sent to those individuals who 
completed a survey in the prior year.1 Standard follow-up procedures were employed, 
including a postcard reminder mailed two weeks after the initial mailing and a second copy 
of the survey mailed one month later. Individuals were provided a $10 incentive for 
completing the survey. 
The contingent valuation referendums analyzed in this study were included only in 
the 2003 and 2005 versions of the survey. The two-year gap between the surveys allowed us 
to vary across the sample both the promise and realization of a delay in voting on the 
referendum, as well to elicit from respondents their perceptions regarding delay, learning and 
the potential for project reversal. This provides the basis for testing the predictions of Zhao 
and Kling’s commitment cost theory. Details of the survey designs for each survey are 
provided in the following subsections, along with summary statistics of the survey responses. 
                                                 
1 A second random sample was added into the panel in 2003 to fill in for the non-deliverable surveys and non-
respondents in 2002. This returned the sample to a total of 8000 individuals. No additional individuals were 
added after 2003. 
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3. 3. 1. The Iowa Lakes Survey 2003  
The 2003 Iowa Lakes Survey was second in the sequence of four mail surveys 
conducted during the Iowa Lakes Project. In January and February of 2003, the survey was 
mailed to 8,000 Iowa households, resulting in a response rate of 68% once non-deliverables 
were considered. Like the first year survey, respondents were asked to provide information 
regarding their visits to key lakes in the state over the past year, as well as to answer a 
sequence of socio-demographic questions.  
The unique feature of the second survey was the addition of a dichotomous choice 
contingent valuation referendum in which respondents were asked to consider proposed 
water quality improvements at one of eight focus lakes. The focus lakes, chosen in 
consultation with the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (IDNR), allowed each 
respondent to be presented with a scenario concerning a lake in their region of the state and, 
hence, of local interest. Moreover, the focus lakes were geographically dispersed and each 
was of policy interest to IDNR as various restoration projects were considered at these lakes. 
Appendix 1 of the dissertation provides an example of the basic contingent valuation 
referendum, in this case targeting Big Creek Lake. The first page of the referendum provided 
a description of the focus lake’s current condition characterized in terms of water clarity, 
water color, variety and quantity of fish, and health concerns from algae blooms and bacterial 
level. A photograph, which demonstrated the water clarity and water color, was provided to 
help respondents visualize the water quality of the focus lake vividly. Finally, a map of the 
lake was included using color to depict both lake depth and water quality.   
The second page of the referendum then described a proposed water quality 
improvement scenario for the focus lake. The scenario outlined the improved water quality 
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condition using the same components used to describe the lake’s current conditions and 
described the methods to achieve the proposed changes, such as dredging and building 
protection strips around the perimeter. Individuals were then asked whether they would vote 
in favor of a referendum to fund the proposed improvements, with a specific cost ranging 
from $100 to $600 payable over a five-year period and randomly assigned to individuals in 
the sample.2  
Of the 7720 deliverable surveys, there was a 68% response rate. There were 524 
observations eliminated for missing values in their votes on the hypothetical referendum or 
their perceptions of the dynamic aspects such as delay, reversal, and future learning. In total, 
4725 observations are used in this study. 
The basic referendum components described above were common to all of the 2003 
CV surveys. Two versions of the surveys, however, were created to investigate predictions of 
the commitment cost theory. To test the effect of potential delay option, a split sample 
treatment was randomly administered allowing us to separate the impact of potential delay in 
the CV responses. Specifically, in version 1 of the survey (denoted V1 hereafter), no mention 
was made of the possibility that the proposed referendum could be revisited in the future. In 
contrast, individuals who received version 2 of the survey (denote V2 hereafter) were told: 
If the referendum fails, any plans to improve the water quality of the lake would 
be delayed for two years while further research takes place into the causes of lake 
pollution as well as alternative clean-up approaches. After this delay, any new 
information from studying the lake will be made available and you will then get a 
final chance to vote on the same referendum.  
 
                                                 
2 In attempt to elicit truthful responses to the CV referendum, a “cheap talk” section suggested by Cummings 
and Taylor (1999) was also contained in this section. 
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Table 3.1 summarizes the aggregate impact that the “delay” treatment in V2 of the 
survey had on individuals’ responses to the CV referendum. If the treatment has an impact on 
WTP as predicted by the commitment cost theory, we would expect to have a significantly 
lower percentage of “yes” votes from V2. In our sample, however, both of the “yes” response 
rates from V1 and V2 are close to 31%. 
 
Table 3.1 Effects of Stated Potential for Delay on CV Responses (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
 N % N % Yes 
V1 2393 0.51 0.31 
V2 2332 0.49 0.31 
Whole Sample 4725 - 0.31 
 
Figure 3.1 provides additional detail regarding the survey responses contrasting the 
voting patterns in versions V1 and V2 of the survey as they vary with the stated cost (or bid 
values). It is evident that the voting patterns under both versions of the survey were 
consistent with economic theory, i.e., the percentage of “yes” responses decreased as the bid 
value increased. However, the similarity in the “yes” response rates may suggest the  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Effect of Stated Delay on Percentage of Yes Responses (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
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ineffectiveness of the treatment. That is, based on the summary statistics provided on 
aggregate in Table 3.1 and by bid values in Figure 3.1, the stated potential for delay appears 
to have no impact on the survey response patterns and, hence, on WTP. 
A final element in the 2003 Iowa Lakes Survey was embedded at the very end of the 
survey, following the standard socio-demographic questions. In this closing section, both 
versions of the survey asked respondents (on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 denotes impossible 
and 5 denotes certainty) to rate the chances of future learning and project reversal. 
Specifically, the question regarding respondents’ perceptions of future learning posed was: 
What do you think is the likelihood that you will get additional information about 
the effectiveness of water quality improvement project in the next few years? 
Table 3.2 summarizes the respondents’ perceptions of future learning and the effect 
of future learning on their responses to the contingent valuation referendum. In aggregate, 
95% respondents perceived positive opportunity for learning about the effectiveness of the 
proposed project and 9% respondents perceived definite potential for future learning. Figure 
3.2 illustrates the respondents’ perceived potential for learning elicited from both versions of 
survey. It is evident that the respondents in the V2 sample were more likely to perceive a 
lower chance to learn the effectiveness of the proposed project. This may imply that the 
“delay” treatment had a negative impact on respondents’ perceptions of future learning.  
 
Table 3.2 Impact of Future Learning on Voting Behavior (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
 Whole Sample V1 V2 
 N % N % Yes N % N % Yes N % N % Yes 
1 227 0.05 0.18 58 0.02 0.12 169 0.07 0.20 
2 1303 0.28 0.28 416 0.17 0.25 887 0.38 0.30 
3 1657 0.35 0.30 912 0.38 0.28 745 0.32 0.32 
4 1106 0.23 0.37 717 0.30 0.38 389 0.17 0.34 
5 432 0.09 0.34 290 0.12 0.34 142 0.06 0.33 
Total 4725 - 0.31 2393 - 0.31 2332 - 0.31 
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of “Learning” Perception (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
 
The theory argues that the respondents would have more incentive to delay their 
decision, i.e., less likely to vote “yes” to the referendum, if they perceived more learning 
potential. As shown in Table 3.2, the respondents’ voting pattern did not conform to the 
theory’s prediction. The respondents who perceived no chance to learn the effectiveness of 
the project had the lowest “yes” response rate. The respondents who perceived positive 
chance to learn the effectiveness of the project were more willing to vote “yes” for the 
project, and the “yes” response rate did not decrease with the respondents’ perceived 
potential for learning.    
Considering the potential for project reversal, individuals were asked: 
 If a water quality project such as this one described on page 9 were initiated but 
later information suggested that it would be ineffective, how likely is it that the 
project would be scrapped? 
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The respondents’ perceptions of reversal and the effect of reversal on their responses 
to the contingent valuation referendum are summarized in Table 3. 3. In this sample, 97% 
respondents perceived positive chance to cancel the project if it were not effective, and 23% 
respondents perceived definite chance to cancel the ineffective project. Figure 3 shows the 
respondents’ perceived potential for canceling the proposed project if it were not effective 
elicited from both version. As shown in Figure 3.3, the similarity of the distributions of 
individuals’ perceived potential for project reversal may imply that the “delay” treatment had 
no influence on respondents’ perceptions of reversal.  
 
Table 3.3 Impact of Reversal on Voting Behavior (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
 Whole Sample V1 V2 
 N % N % Yes N % N % Yes N % N % Yes 
1 120 0.03 0.11 60 0.03 0.12 60 0.03 0.10 
2 721 0.15 0.27 340 0.14 0.28 381 0.16 0.26 
3 1320 0.28 0.29 659 0.28 0.29 661 0.28 0.30 
4 1472 0.31 0.35 771 0.32 0.34 701 0.30 0.35 
5 1092 0.23 0.32 563 0.24 0.32 529 0.23 0.33 
Total 4725 - 0.31 2393 - 0.31 2332 - 0.31 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Distribution of “Reversal” Perception (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
 55
The theory predicts that respondents would have less incentive to delay their 
decisions i.e., be more willing to vote “yes” to the referendum, if they perceived a higher 
likelihood to scrap an ineffective project. It is shown in Table 3.3 that, consistent with the 
theory, the respondents who perceived that the proposed project was irreversible had the 
lowest “yes” response rate. The respondents who perceived positive chance to cancel an 
ineffective project had higher “yes” response rates and the “yes” response rate increased with 
the respondents’ perceived potential for reversal. 
Finally, respondents to V1 of the survey were also asked to rate the possibility that 
the proposed referendum would be revisited at a later date, with the following wording: 
If a project such as this one described on page 9 failed to pass in a referendum, 
what do you think is the likelihood that another, similar project would be 
considered within the next few years? 
Without mention of the possibility that the proposed referendum could be revisited in 
the future, Table 3.4 summarizes respondents’ perceived potential for delay and the effect of 
delay on their responses to the contingent valuation referendum. In the V1 sample, 97% 
respondents perceived positive opportunity to vote on a similar referendum again, and 10% 
of the sample perceive definite chance to vote on a similar referendum in the future.  
 
Table 3.4 Impact of Delay on Voting Behavior (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
 V1 
 N % N % Yes 
1 82 0.03 0.17 
2 583 0.24 0.31 
3 851 0.36 0.30 
4 627 0.26 0.34 
5 250 0.10 0.30 
Total 2393 - 0.31 
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The theory predicts that the respondents would be less willing to vote “yes” to the 
referendum if they perceived positive chance for delay. From Table 3.4, the respondents who 
perceived no chance to vote on a similar referendum in the future had the lowest “yes” 
response rate. Contrary to the theory’s prediction, the respondents who perceived positive 
opportunity to vote on a similar project in the future had higher “yes” response rates, and the 
“yes” response rate did not decrease monotonically with their perceptions of delay.   
3. 3. 2. The Iowa Lakes Survey 2005  
The final survey of the Iowa Lakes Project in 2005 provided respondents an 
opportunity to revisit the CV referendum posed in 2003 and, in doing so, fulfilled our 
promise to those respondents receiving version V2 of the survey that they could indeed vote 
again on the proposed project. The survey also allowed us to ask individuals a series of new 
questions regarding how much they had learned over the years. At the same time, other 
factors reduced the proportion of the survey sample that could be allocated to the 
commitment cost issue. First, one of the focus lakes, Storm Lake, became the target of a 
major restoration effort, making our original proposed water quality scenario moot. Second, 
four of the focus lakes were set aside for our investigation into the impact of consequentiality, 
discussed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation. Thus, only three of the original eight focus lakes 
were used in 2005 to further study the commitment cost theory. For this subgroup, the 
relevant surveys were sent out to 1638 individuals who responded in the prior year. Of the 
1361 deliverable surveys, there was a 96% response rate. There were 205 observations 
eliminated for missing values in their votes on the CV referendum or in the relevant 
following questions. In total, 1100 observations are used in this portion of our analysis.  
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There are basically two elements of the 2005 survey design related to our 
investigation into the commitment cost theory. The first element revisits the issue of potential 
impact of delay on WTP. As in 2003, a split sample treatment was employed.3 For half of the 
sample (labeled NV1 hereafter), no mention was made regarding the possibility of revisiting 
the referendum at future date. For the other half of the sample (labeled NV2 hereafter), they 
were told: 
When you answer this question, please remember that this is the last year of 
funding for this survey research. You may remember that two years ago we asked 
you a similar question; however, we will not be contacting you again to ask you 
this question. You will not have another such opportunity to express your views to 
us regarding such a referendum. Further, we know of no other plans to obtain 
your views regarding water quality improvements.   
Table 3.5 summarizes the aggregate impact of the “immediacy” treatment in NV2 of 
the survey had on respondents’ responses to the contingent valuation referendum. The theory 
predicts that the respondents who were told the immediacy of the project would be no less 
willing to vote “yes” than the respondents in sample NV1. Contrary to the theory, the 
percentage of “yes” response for NV2 was slightly lower than that from NV1. Figure 3.4 
provides detail regarding the voting patterns of respondents in treatment groups NV1 and 
NV2 breaking down the responses by bid values.4 As illustrated in Figure 3.4, the voting 
patterns of NV1 and NV2 are generally consistent with the economic theory. The percentage 
of “yes” responses typically decreases as the bid value increases, though the percentage of 
“yes” response from NV2 is slightly lower than that from NV1. Based on the summary  
                                                 
3 The split sample treatment was once again randomly assigned and, thus, orthogonal to the 2003 split sample 
treatment. 
4 In comparing Figure 1 and 4, it is apparent that some lower bid values were used in the 2005 survey compared 
to the 2003 survey. In fact, in order to better determine at what half of the population would say “yes” to the 
CV scenario, the 2005 survey bid values were set at one-tenth their 2003 levels for half of the survey. 
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Table 3.5 Effect of Stated Immediacy on CV Responses (Iowa Lakes Survey 2005) 
 N % N % Yes 
NV1 548 0.50 0.42 
NV2 552 0.50 0.38 
Whole Sample 1100 - 0.40 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Effect of Stated Immediacy on Percentage of Yes Responses (Iowa Lakes Survey 2005) 
 
statistics provided in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.4, the stated immediacy of the project seems to 
have had no impact on individuals’ voting patterns. 
The second key element of the 2005 survey was a series of perception questions. In 
this section, both versions of the survey asked respondents (on a scale from 1 to 5) to rate 
their self-perceived knowledge level and knowledge increment about the general water 
quality in Iowa lakes and the chance of revisiting a similar referendum in the future. 
Individuals’ knowledge level about the general water quality in Iowa lakes was elicited with 
the following question:  
How well informed are you about the general state of water quality in Iowa’s 
lakes? 
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where a “1” denoted “not well informed at all” and a “5” denoted “very knowledgeable.” 
The distribution of respondents’ self-perceived knowledge level and the impact of the 
knowledge level on their vote to the referendum are summarized in Table 3.6. In this sample, 
19% respondents perceived themselves knowing nothing about the water quality in Iowa 
lakes, 79% respondents had some knowledge, and 2% respondents were “very 
knowledgeable.” Figure 3.5 provides a comparison of respondents’ self-perceived knowledge  
 
Table 3.6 Impact of “Knowledge” on Voting Behavior (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
 Whole Sample NV1 NV2 
 N % N % Yes N % N % Yes N % N % Yes 
1 205 0.19 0.27 101 0.18 0.28 104 0.19 0.27 
2 321 0.29 0.37 162 0.30 0.41 159 0.29 0.33 
3 384 0.35 0.44 194 0.35 0.46 190 0.34 0.42 
4 163 0.15 0.48 78 0.14 0.51 85 0.15 0.45 
5 27 0.02 0.48 13 0.02 0.31 14 0.03 0.64 
Total 1100 - 0.40 548 - 0.42 552 - 0.38 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Distribution of “Knowledge Level” Perception (Iowa Lakes Survey 2005) 
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level in NV1 sample and NV2 sample. The similarity of perceived knowledge level 
distributions may suggest that the “immediacy” treatment had no effect on respondents’ 
perceptions of knowledge level about general water quality in Iowa lakes. We would, of 
course, not expect an impact here, given the random nature of the treatment assignment. 
The commitment cost theory predicts that respondents who were more knowledgeable 
about the good have less incentive to delay their decision, i.e., more willing to vote “yes” to 
the referendum.5 We found a voting pattern consistent with the theory’s prediction. 
Specifically, respondents who perceived that they knew nothing about the general water 
quality in Iowa lakes were less willing to vote “yes” to the referendum. The respondents who 
had some knowledge about the general water quality in Iowa lakes had higher “yes” response 
rates, and the “yes” response rate increased with their knowledge level.   
To assess the respondents’ knowledge increment about the general water quality in 
Iowa lakes after participating in the Iowa Lakes Project, respondents were asked to report 
their knowledge increment with the following wording: 
How would you assess your knowledge of water quality in Iowa’s lakes now, 
relative to three or four years ago? 
where a “1” denoted “I know much less,” and a “3” denoted “I know about the same,” 
and a “5” denoted “I know much more.” Table 3.7 summarizes the distribution regarding the 
respondents’ self-evaluated knowledge increment and the impact of knowledge increment on 
their decision. There were 10 % respondents perceived that they knew less, 58% perceived 
that they knew about the same, and 32% perceived that they knew more after participating 
                                                 
5 This result should be interpreted with some caution due to a potential endogeniety issue of the individuals’ 
knowledge. In particular, individuals who hold a higher WTP may seek to be more knowledgeable about the 
proposal.   
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the Iowa Lakes Project. Figure 3. 6 compares the distributions of knowledge increment 
between NV1 and NV2. It is evident that the “immediacy” treatment did not have an impact  
Table 3.7 Impact of “Knowledge Increment” on Voting Behavior (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
 Whole Sample NV1 NV2 
 N % N % Yes N % N % Yes N % N % Yes 
1 42 0.04 0.29 20 0.04 0.30 22 0.04 0.27 
2 65 0.06 0.25 43 0.08 0.30 22 0.04 0.14 
3 642 0.58 0.38 323 0.59 0.40 319 0.58 0.36 
4 282 0.26 0.47 126 0.23 0.54 156 0.28 0.42 
5 69 0.06 0.41 36 0.06 0.31 33 0.06 0.52 
Total 1100 - 0.40 548 - 0.42 552 - 0.38 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Distribution of “Knowledge Increment” Perception (Iowa Lakes Survey 2005) 
 
on respondents’ self-assessing knowledge increment since NV1 sample had a similar 
knowledge increment distribution to NV2 sample.  
Regarding the impact of learning on respondents’ voting behavior, the theory predicts 
that respondents who perceive that they will learn more information about the good would 
have more incentive to delay their decision, i.e., less willing to vote “yes” to the referendum. 
In aggregate, we found that respondents who perceived that they knew less after participating 
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the Iowa Lakes Projects were less willing to vote “yes” to the referendum than the 
respondents who perceived that they knew about the same or more. 
Finally, respondents’ perceptions of further delay were elicited as follows: 
In this survey, we have asked you about your usage of Iowa’s lakes and your 
views about water quality improvements. Do you believe that you are likely to 
have other opportunities to express your views about water quality projects and 
programs? 
where a “1” denoted “not likely at all” and a “5” denoted “very likely.” Table 3. 8 
summarizes the respondents’ perceptions of further delay and the impact of further delay on 
their votes to the referendum. In aggregate, 28% respondents perceived no further chance, 
and 5% respondents perceived definite chance to vote on a similar referendum in the future. 
Recall that we employed a split sample treatment regarding the “immediacy” of the proposed 
project in NV2 version of the survey. We expect that the respondents who responded to the 
NV2 version of survey perceived lower potential for delay. Figure 3.7 compares respondents’ 
perceptions of delay with and without the “immediacy” treatment. The treatment did not have 
effect on respondents’ perceptions of delay since the NV2 sample’s perceptions of delay 
were not significant different from the NV1 sample’s.  
Table 3.8 Impact of “Further Delay” on Voting Behavior (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
 Whole Sample NV1 NV2 
 N % N % Yes N % N % Yes N % N % Yes 
1 308 0.28 0.30 156 0.28 0.33 152 0.28 0.26 
2 258 0.23 0.43 119 0.22 0.45 139 0.25 0.40 
3 310 0.28 0.44 161 0.29 0.47 149 0.27 0.40 
4 168 0.15 0.39 82 0.15 0.34 86 0.16 0.44 
5 56 0.05 0.57 30 0.05 0.63 26 0.05 0.50 
Total 1100 - 0.40 548 - 0.42 552 - 0.38 
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Figure 3.7 Distribution of “Further Delay” Perception (Iowa Lakes Survey 2005) 
 
The theory predicts that respondents who perceived more likelihood to delay their 
decision would less likely to vote “yes” to the referendum. Similar to the result in the 2003 
survey, we did not find a voting pattern consistent with the theory’s prediction. In aggregate, 
the respondents who perceive no chance to vote on a similar referendum had the lowest “yes” 
response rate, while the respondents who perceived positive opportunity to revisit a similar 
referendum had higher “yes” response rates and the “yes” response rate did not decrease with 
the respondents’ perceived potential for delay. 
Also of note, individuals’ perceptions for delay changed significantly between the 
2003 and 2005 survey. As shown in Figure 3.8, only 3% respondents perceived no potential 
for delay in the 2003 sample, while 28% respondents perceived no chance for delay in the 
2005 sample. Further, respondents held lower probability of delay in the 2005 survey in 
general. The change in individuals’ perception of delay might be explained by the 
information provided in the 2003 and 2005 survey cover letter. In particular, the 2003 sample 
was informed that multiple years of data will be collected and their repeated responses are  
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opportunity for delay. On the contrary, the finality information provided to the 2005 sample 
might convince individuals to perceive lower probability for delay.  
 
Figure 3.8 Distribution of Perceived Potential for Delay in 2003 and 2005 Surveys  
3. 4. Empirical Results 
To control for differences in survey designs, perceptions of dynamic aspects, and 
socio-demographic characteristics across respondents, we use a probit model to investigate 
the effects of the survey designs and perceptions of dynamic aspects on WTP. Details of the 
employed probit model and estimation results along with related discussion are provided in 
the following subsections. 
3. 4. 1. Model 
Following Cameron (1989), the dichotomous contingent valuation referendum 
responses in both of the 2003 and 2005 surveys can be interpreted indicating whether an 
individual’s WTP exceeds the proposed bid value and can be modeled parametrically with a 
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linear WTP function. Assume that the unobserved continuous variable, *iW , is the 
individual’s latent log willingness to pay for the proposed water quality improvement, with 
 *i i iW X ε= +β   (3.1) 
where iX  is a vector of explanatory variables and ( )2~ 0,iidi Nε σ . The latent variable, *iW , is 
not observed but its value generates an observed indicator variable, iW , as follows: 
 
( )
( )
*
*
0    if log
1    if log
i i
i
i i
W B
W
W B
⎧ <⎪= ⎨ >⎪⎩
 (3.2) 
where iB  is the bid value ranging from $100 to $600 payable over a five-year period and 
randomly assigned to individual i.  
We fitted the parameters of the model in equation (1) and (2) using Bayesian 
estimation with data augmentation, following the work of Albert and Chib (1993)6. We used 
several generating data experiments to test the performance of the algorithm. These 
experiments revealed that our algorithm mixed reasonably well, i.e., the lagged 
autocorrelations among our parameter simulations were not severe. Further, the algorithm 
recovered parameters of the pseudo-data. In each application of the model, we ran our 
posterior simulator for 6,000 simulations and discard the first 1,000 simulations as burn-in. 
We also used numerous chains with dispersed starting values to verify if the posterior 
distribution converged to the target distribution. 
                                                 
6 The prior and the posterior simulator are fully described in the appendix. 
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3. 4. 2. Findings from Iowa Lakes Survey 2003  
The responses from the Iowa Lakes Survey 2003 are used to examine the 
commitment cost theory from two perspectives. First, we examine the impact of delay on 
individuals’ WTP. In particular, as described in the previous section, the 2003 survey 
included a split sample treatment in which half of the sample was promised a second chance 
to vote on the contingent valuation referendum. In this case, we examine the theory by 
determining if respondents who were promised a second chance to vote on the referendum 
had a lower WTP.  
Second, we use respondents’ perceived potential for delay, reversal, and future 
learning elicited in the survey to examine the influence of the dynamic aspects on 
respondents’ WTP in an ordinary CV referendum. In particular, we use the responses from 
the V1 sample regarding their perceptions for delay, reversal, and future learning, and their 
responses to the contingent valuation referendum to examine the influence of the dynamic 
aspects on their WTP. 
To determine the impact of “delay” treatment on WTP, we assume  
*
0 1 2 3 4 5i i i i i i iW Treatment Age Female College Incomeβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +  
where 1iTreatment = if the individual received version V2 of the survey (promising a second 
chance to vote on the referendum), 0=  otherwise; 1iFemale =  if the respondent was female, 
0=  otherwise; and 1iCollege =  if the respondent completed college, 0=  otherwise. iAge  
and iIncome  denote the age and household income of the survey respondent with both 
variables standardized to have a mean zero and unit variance, respectively.  
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The commitment cost theory suggests that respondents who were able to revisit their 
decision at some future date would take into account this opportunity, and report a lower 
WTP. Therefore, we expect 1β  to be negative. The signs of the remaining coefficients are 
indeterminate, though the literature typically finds 3β , 4β , 5β  to be positive.  
Table 3.9 presents results of the probit model regarding the impact of the “delay” 
treatment on WTP. The first column of the table reports the posterior mean, the second 
column reports the posterior standard deviation, and the final column reports the probability 
that the parameter value is positive. Values in the final column near either 1 or 0 indicate a 
high probability of difference from zero, the former in the positive direction and the latter in 
the negative. The coefficients associated with the demographic variables in the WTP function 
are generally consistent with our expectation. Individuals who are younger, female, with 
college education, and higher income are more willing to pay for the water quality 
improvement project. However, we do not find very strong support for the commitment cost 
theory. Specifically, the posterior mean of the treatment is negative (-0.04) as expected, but 
the posterior distribution is almost evenly divided between positive and negative values, with 
( )1Pr 0 | 0.36yβ > = .  
Table 3.9 Treatment Effect on Willingness to Pay (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
Willingness to Pay, N = 4223 
Variable  ( )|E yi  ( )|Std yi  ( )Pr 0 | y>i  
Intercept 3.71 0.15 1.00 
Treatment -0.04 0.11 0.36 
Age  -0.19 0.06 0.00 
Female  0.32 0.12 1.00 
College  0.65 0.13 1.00 
Income  0.26 0.06 1.00 
Variance of WTP 
2
wσ  6.55 0.68 - 
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The indifference of the WTP between the treated and the non-treated samples does 
not necessarily imply that delay does not have an impact on WTP. Instead, the indifference 
may be due to the ineffectiveness of the treatment. In particular, the treatment was used to 
reinforce the individuals’ perceived potential for delay and in hope for separating out the 
impact of delay on WTP. Recall that 97% respondents who were not promised a second vote 
perceived positive opportunity to vote on the same referendum in the future and 10% 
respondents perceived definite opportunity to vote on the same referendum in the future. We 
suspect that the “delay” treatment did not significantly strengthen the treated respondents’ 
perceived potential for delay as we expected so that the treated sample did not hold a lower 
WTP than the non-treated sample. However, this conjecture cannot be identified since the V2 
sample’s perceived potential for delay was not elicited. 
We now turn to respondents’ perceptions of delay, learning, and project reversal 
elicited in the survey to examine the relationship between the dynamic aspects and 
respondents’ WTP. Incorporating individuals’ perceived delay, reversal, and learning into the 
WTP function, we assume 
*
0 1 2 3 4 5 6( ) Rei i i i i i i i iW Delay Learn verse Age Female College Incomeβ β β β β β β ε= + × + + + + + +  
where iDelay , iLearn , and Re iverse  using index 1 to 5 to indicate respondent 'i s  
perceptions of delay, learning, and reversal with 1 denotes impossible and 5 denotes definite 
possibility; ( )i iDelay Learn×  indicates the interaction of respondent 'i s  perceived delay and 
learning.  
The commitment cost theory predicts that respondents who perceived having 
potential opportunities to revisit the referendum and getting more information about the 
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proposal would report a lower WTP. In addition, if the respondents perceived higher 
likelihood to cancel an ineffective project, they would report a higher WTP. Therefore, we 
expect 1β  to be negative and 2β to be positive.  
Specification (1) of Table 3.10 presents the results of the probit model regarding the 
effects of respondents’ perceived delay, learning, and reversal on their WTP. The cross effect 
of respondents’ perceived delay and reversal does not influence their WTP as the theory 
predicts. In particular, the respondents who perceived more potential to revisit the 
referendum and expected to obtain more information about the project reported a higher 
WTP. In contrast, the respondents’ perceived opportunity for reversal influence their WTP, 
as the theory would predict. In particular, the respondents who perceived a greater chance to 
cancel an ineffective project have a higher WTP.  
 
Table 3.10 Effects of Perceived Dynamic Aspects on WTP (Iowa Lakes Survey 2003) 
Willingness to Pay, N = 2144 
Variable  Specification (1) Specification (2) 
 ( )|E yi  ( )|Std yi  ( )Pr 0 | y>i  ( )|E yi  ( )|Std yi  ( )Pr 0 | y>i  
Intercept 3.34 0.47 1.00 3.30 0.60 1.00 
Delay*Learn  0.07 0.02 1.00 0.08 0.07 0.89 
Reverse  0.15 0.07 0.99 0.13 0.07 0.97 
Delay - - - -0.16 0.17 0.17 
Learn - - - 0.17 0.17 0.86 
Age  -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
Female  0.29 0.16 0.97 0.32 0.17 0.97 
College  0.41 0.18 0.99 0.40 0.18 0.99 
Income  0.01 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Variance of WTP 
2
wσ  6.98 1.61 - 7.57 1.61 - 
 
In the specification (2) of Table 3.10, we examine the direct effects of respondents’ 
perceived potential for delay, learning, and reversal along with the cross effect of delay and 
learning on their WTP; i.e., let 
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*
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
( ) Re
             
i i i i i i i
i i i i
W Delay Learn verse Delay Learn Age
Female College Income
β β β β β β
β β β β β β ε
= + × + + + +
+ + + + + + +  
The estimated coefficients of the probit model suggest that the effects of respondents’ 
perceived opportunity for delay and learning on WTP are mixed. The coefficient on delay is 
negative with somewhat weak support for its sign, with ( )3Pr 0 | 0.17yβ > = . The direct 
learning coefficient ( 4β ) is positive with ( )4Pr 0 | 0.86yβ > = . The interaction between 
delay and learning perceptions is positive, again contrary to the expectation from the theory, 
though ( )2Pr 0 | 0.89yβ > = . Finally, the effect of reversal is positive, as the theory would 
predict. 
Overall, in this sample, perceptions for reversal were positively correlated with the 
individual’s revealed WTP. In other words, respondents who perceived positive opportunity 
to cancel an ineffective project had a higher WTP, as the theory would predict. However, 
contrary to the expectation of the theory, the interaction between respondents’ delay and 
learning perception had a positive impact on WTP.  
3. 4. 3. Findings from Iowa Lakes Survey 2005  
In Iowa Lakes Survey 2003, we examine the impact of delay on WTP with a 
promised second chance to vote on the referendum. The impact of delay on WTP is 
examined with a reverse perspective in Iowa Lakes Survey 2005. Specifically, after a two-
year lag with more information gathered, half of the 2005 sample was randomly informed 
that this is the last year of this study and there is no other water quality improvement plan so 
that they will not have another opportunity to vote on the referendum. We use the 
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“immediacy” treatment to weaken the treated respondents’ perceived potential for delay and 
in doing so, examine the impact of “immediacy” on WTP.  
In addition, we examine the commitment cost theory regarding the impact of 
individuals’ knowledge perceptions on WTP. In particular, the theory suggests that 
individuals who are well informed about the good or who do not expect to learn more 
information in the future would have less incentive to delay their purchase decision and, thus, 
have a higher WTP.  
We first examine the impact of the “immediacy” treatment on WTP by assuming 
*
0 1 2 3 3 4i i i i i i iW Treatment Age Female College Incomeβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +   
where 1iTreatment = if the individual received version NV2 of the survey (indicating the last 
year of the study and no other opportunity to vote on the water quality improvement project), 
0=  otherwise. If the “immediacy” treatment weakened respondents’ perceived potential for 
delay and respondents responded in the manner predicted by the commitment cost theory, we 
expect 1β  to be positive.  
The impact of the “immediacy” treatment on WTP is presented in Table 3.11. In this 
sample, respondents who were older, female, with college education, and higher income were 
more willing to pay for the proposed project. However, we do not find evidence supporting 
the commitment cost theory. Specifically, contrary to the theory’s prediction, the posterior  
 
Table 3.11 Treatment Effects on Willingness to Pay (Iowa Lakes Survey 2005) 
Willingness to Pay, N = 1100 
Variable  ( )|E yi  ( )|Std yi  ( )Pr 0 | y>i  
Intercept 3.42 0.26 1.00 
Treatment -0.19 0.22 0.19 
Age  0.26 0.16 0.99 
Female  0.17 0.24 0.77 
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College  0.98 0.26 1.00 
Income  0.27 0.12 0.99 
Variance of WTP 
2
wσ  7.43 1.61 - 
mean of the treatment parameter on WTP is negative, (-0.19), though ( )1Pr 0 | 0.19yβ > = . 
The weak impact of the treatment on WTP can be explained, in part, by the ineffectiveness of 
the treatment itself, since respondents who were informed the “immediacy” of the project did 
not have significant different perceptions of delay from the respondents who were not 
informed the immediacy of the project. 
Next, examine the effects of respondents’ knowledge perceptions on WTP. To test 
how respondents’ knowledge perceptions influenced WTP, their WTP is estimated as 
*
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7             
i i i i
i i i i i
W Delay KnowIncreased Knowledge
Age Female College Income
β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + +
+ + + + +  
where 1,2,3,4,5iDelay =  with 1 indicates no chance to revisit the referendum and 5 
indicates definite chance to revisit the referendum; 1,2,3,4,5iKnowIncreased =  with 1 
indicating know much less, 3 indicating know about the same, and 5 indicating know much 
more; and 1,2,3,4,5iKnowledge =  with 1 indicating not informed at all, and 5 indicating 
well informed.  
The commitment cost theory suggests that the value of the compensation respondents 
would ask for giving up her opportunity for delay depends on the value of the information. If 
respondents were well informed about the good or if respondents perceived less information 
about the good will be available, the value of delay would be lower. Thus, they would have 
less incentive to delay their decisions, i.e., higher WTP. Therefore, we would expect 2β  and 
3β  to be positive, while 1β  would be negative.   
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Table 3. 12 presents the result of the probit model. The knowledge increment 
coefficient ( 2β ) is positive, but with week support for its sign, ( )2Pr 0 | 0.66yβ > = . The  
Table 3. 12 Effects of Perceived Dynamic Aspects on WTP (Iowa Lakes Survey 2005) 
Willingness to Pay, N=548 
 ( )|E yi  ( )|Std yi  ( )Pr 0 | y>i  
Intercept 1.99 0.75 0.99 
Delay 0.20 0.14 0.93 
Knowledge Increment 0.08 0.20 0.66 
Knowledge 0.28 0.17 0.95 
Age  0.17 0.15 0.87 
Female  0.76 0.33 0.99 
College  0.69 0.34 0.98 
Income  0.14 0.16 0.82 
Variance 
2
wσ  6.63 1.80 - 
 
coefficient on respondents’ knowledge level is positive, as the theory predicts. In particular, 
respondents’ WTP did not increase with the information about the water quality in Iowa 
lakes they had learned. However, respondents who were more knowledgeable about the 
general water quality in Iowa lakes tend to have a higher WTP. Regarding respondents’ 
perceptions for further delay, contrary to the theory’s prediction, the coefficient on delay is 
positive; i.e., respondents who perceived higher potential for further delay tend to have a 
higher WTP. 
3. 5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The welfare measurement from a contingent valuation exercise is typically conceived 
as being static in nature. However, respondents’ decisions are often dynamic. Incorporating 
the consequences of uncertainty, learning, and irreversibility, the commitment cost theory 
suggests that the formation of the welfare measurement is a dynamic process. Therefore, 
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researchers need to reflect the potential for delay, learning, and reversal carefully in survey 
instruments. 
In this paper, we examine the impacts of delay, learning, and irreversibility in two 
ways. First, we employed split sample treatments associated with the potential for delay to 
test the effect of delay on respondents’ votes to the contingent valuation referendums. 
Specifically, half of our 2003 sample was promised a second chance to vote on the same 
referendum two years later. The 2005 version of survey provided respondents an opportunity 
to revisit the referendum posed in the 2003 version of survey. At the same time, half of the 
2005 sample was randomly assigned a split sample treatment associated with the immediacy 
of the proposed project. Our findings showed that the exogenous treatments did not influence 
respondents’ voting behavior and, hence, WTP. In other words, respondents who were 
promised a second chance to vote on the referendum did not have a lower WTP to the 2003 
contingent valuation referendum. Furthermore, respondents who were told the immediacy of 
the project did not have a higher WTP to the 2005 contingent valuation referendum.  
These results did not necessarily suggest that the potential for delay did not influence 
respondents’ voting behavior. Instead, we would argue that the exogenous treatments 
employed in this study were not effective as expected. As a result, the failure of our treatment 
may stress the importance of a clear communication about the intertemporal aspects of the 
proposal in a contingent valuation referendum.  
Next, we explored the linkage between the respondents’ perceived dynamic aspects 
and their voting behavior. In particular, respondents’ perceptions of delay, learning, and 
reversal were elicited in the 2003 version of survey. Incorporating respondents’ self-reported 
potential for delay, learning, and reversal into consideration, we found that, as the theory’s 
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prediction, respondents who perceived a greater chance to cancel an ineffective project tend 
to have a higher WTP. However, the interaction between delay and learning did not influence 
respondents’ voting behavior as the theory predicted. In particular, the theory expected that 
respondents who perceive more possibility to revisit the referendum and to obtain more 
information about the proposed project tend to have a lower WTP. Contrary to the theory’s 
prediction, our result suggested that the interaction between delay and learning had a positive 
impact on WTP. Regarding the direct effects of delay and learning, our result weakly 
supported that respondents who expected less possibility to revisit the referendum and who 
expected more possibility to obtain more information about the proposed project tend to have 
a higher WTP.   
In the 2005 version of survey, besides perceptions of delay, we asked respondents 
self-evaluated their knowledge and knowledge increment about the general water quality in 
Iowa lakes during the process of Iowa Lakes Project. The information was used to examine 
the relationship between knowledge, learning behavior, and their WTP. First, our results 
showed that respondents’ knowledge increment about the proposed project did not influence 
their WTP. Second, respondents who were more knowledgeable about the general water 
quality in Iowa lakes tend to have a higher WTP. Finally, contrary to the empirical result in 
2003 survey, respondents’ perceived potential for delay had a positive impact on their WTP.  
In general, our findings regarding the correlation between respondents’ perceived 
dynamic aspects and WTP suggested that respondents would have a higher WTP if they 
perceived (a) that it was more likely to reverse their decisions, (b) that they were more 
knowledgeable about the proposed project. However, the correlation between the 
respondents’ perceived delay and learning had a mixed effect on their WTP. In particular, the 
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interaction between respondents’ perceived delay and learning was positively correlated with 
their WTP. The respondents’ perceived potential for acquiring more information about the 
proposed project was positively correlated with their WTP. The respondents’ perceived 
potential for revisiting the referendum was negatively correlated with their WTP in the 2003 
survey and was positively correlated with their WTP in the 2005 survey.  
The mixed effect of respondents’ perceived delay may suggest that there may be an 
endogeniety problem. One the one hand, respondents who perceived a higher potential to 
revisit the referendum may require a higher compensation to commit this decision, and hence, 
may hold a lower WTP. On the other hand, respondents who held a higher WTP may 
perceive a higher possibility to revisit the referendum. Normally, researchers would use an 
exogenous treatment to control for the endogeniety problem. Unfortunately, our exogenous 
treatments in 2003 survey and in 2005 survey did not successfully reinforce respondents’ 
perceived potential for delay in the direction as we expected. Therefore, these treatments did 
not separate out the effect of respondents’ perceived delay on their WTP. These results may 
suggest that a clear reflection of the dynamic aspects in a contingent valuation referendum is 
essential in obtaining a precise welfare measure. Our future works include (a) exploring 
effective treatments in communicating the dynamic aspects of the proposed project, (b) 
exploring the implications of various dynamic aspects surrounding individuals’ behavior in 
dynamic environments, and (c) exploring the correlation between respondents’ characteristics 
and their responses to the dynamic aspects.   
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Appendix 3.A The Bayesian Estimation of Probit Model 
Priors and the Joint Posterior 
We fit the probit model using a Gibbs sampler with data augmentation suggested by 
Albert and Chib (1993). ). The augmented posterior distribution involves adding the latent 
*
iW  to the joint posterior distribution. Under prior independence, the joint distribution can be 
represented as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
, | , |
                                  , | ,
N
i
p W p p p p
p p p p
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ
=
∝
= ∏
W W W W
W W W
, , ,
, ,
* * *
* *
i i i
W W |W W
W |W W
β β β β
β β β  
where the product term follows from the assumed conditional independence across 
observations. For the first term on the right-hand side of the product, note 
( ) ( ),p pσ =W,* *i i i iW |W W |Wβ  
where 
( ) ( )log( )ip I B= >* *i i iW |W W  
Apart from the priors, the remaining pieces in our joint posterior follow immediately 
from our normality assumption: 
( )* | ~ ,iidiW Nσ σW Wβ, xβ  
The model is completed by choosing priors of the forms: 
( )~ ,N ββ Vβ μ  
( )1 ~ ,W Gamma vσ − R  
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For our priors, we use β = 0μ , ( )2100 kβ = IV , 100R = , and 10v = , which are reasonably 
non-informative choices, suggesting the information coming from the data will dominate 
information added through our prior. 
The Posterior Simulator 
Step 1. Drawing from ( )*| ,Wp Wσβ , where. 
( )*| , ,W W N V βσ β∼β  
and 
1 1' 1 * ' 1
1 1
,     
N N
i i i i
i i
V W V V Vβ ββ ββ β− −− −
= =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= Σ + = Σ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑X X X . 
Step 2. Drawing from ( )1 *| ,Wp Wσ − β , where 
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A Gibbs sampler proceeds by simulating (in order) from the posterior conditional distribution. 
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Chapter 4. A Comparison of Value Elicitation Question Formats in 
Multiple Good Contingent Valuation 
 
4. 1. Introduction 
Economists use a variety of stated preference elicitation methods to estimate the 
economic value of non-market goods. Those various elicitation methods, particularly the 
form of the question used to infer value, have been the focus of a number of studies. The 
earliest elicitation question used is an “open-ended” question where respondents are asked 
directly to state their willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) for a given 
environmental change (Mitchell and Carson, 1986). While straightforward, respondents may 
find it difficult to answer an “open-ended” question for an environmental change they are not 
familiar with, and they may skip the valuation question or give unreliable answers. Therefore, 
the “open-ended” question often leads to a large number of non-responses and outliers 
(Desvousges, Smith, and McGivney, 1983).  
An alternative elicitation format is the “payment card” approach where respondents 
are provided a list of monetary amounts and are asked to choose the level of payment that 
most closely approximates their WTP or WTA (Mitchell and Carson 1981, 1984). This 
method reduces the number of non-responses and outliers. However, the payment card 
question is sensitive to biases relating to the range of the numbers listed on the payment card 
(Mitchell and Carson, 1989).   
In addition to the potential biases embedded in the “open-ended” and “payment card” 
formats, a fundamental issue about respondents’ strategic behavior exists in both elicitation 
formats. Mitchell and Carson (1989) provide a detailed review of respondent’s strategic 
behavior. Specifically, respondents would be expected to overbid if they believe that they 
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will not have to pay their stated amounts even though the stated amounts would positively 
influence the provision of the good. On the other hand, respondents would be expected to 
underbid for the good if they believe they will have to pay their stated amount, and they 
perceive that other respondents will bid enough to provide the good. Mitchell and Carson 
present the evidence of strategic behavior in contingent valuation studies and suggest 
important factors in the preference revelation process which may mitigate the respondent’s 
strategic behavior, such as information cost and social norms of altruism and truthfulness. 
Thus, they argue that respondents’ strategic behavior can be prevented in preference 
revelation process, or at least be minimized.  
The third question format is the “dichotomous choice” question in which respondents 
are provided two alternatives with one alternative typically being the status quo, and asked to 
choose one of them. The dichotomous choice question has several advantages and is now the 
most commonly used elicitation format since it was popularized by Bishop and Heberlein 
(1979). In particular, the “take-it-or-leave-it” question simplifies the respondents’ task by 
asking respondents to decide whether to vote for or against the proposal at the fixed price 
provided. This is easier for the respondents than open-ended questions and result in higher 
response rates. More importantly, the dichotomous choice question circumvents the potential 
for strategic voting behavior and is incentive compatible. Indeed, one of the core theoretical 
results in mechanism design, derived independently by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite 
(1975), is that no response method involving more than two choices can be incentive 
compatible without restrictions on the agents’ preferences.  
However, the dichotomous choice question can only measure the relative value 
between two alternatives. When more than two alternatives are under consideration, a 
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researcher needs different constructs to elicit respondents’ preferences. A number of stated 
choice methods commonly used in marketing and transportation literature have recently been 
applied in environmental valuation (Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams, 1994; Garrod and 
Willis, 1996; Mackenzie, 1993; Roe, Boyle, and Teisl, 1996). These methods provide the 
respondents with a set of alternatives, each fully characterized by levels of attributes and 
costs. The respondents are then asked to rate the alternatives, to rank the alternatives, to 
choose the most preferred alternative, or to evaluate a series of pair-wise comparisons among 
the alternatives. With careful experimental design, these methods can be used to estimate 
economic value for the attributes of the environmental goods. The main difference between 
these stated choice approaches and contingent valuation is the focus of the former on 
obtaining marginal values for the attributes of the good.  
Within the contingent valuation framework, the multinomial choice question is the 
most straightforward method when more than two alternatives are involved in the valuation 
process. Under a multinomial choice question, respondents are asked to choose the most 
preferred alternative out of a choice set. The respondents’ answers to the multinomial choice 
question reveal the relative values between the chosen one and the other alternatives. 
However, the multinomial choice question may suffer from strategic voting behavior. 
Specifically, a respondent’s choice among multiple policy alternatives may depend not only 
on his preferences among the alternatives, but also on his or her his belief about how the 
government will translate the survey results into action and his belief concerning other 
respondents’ preference.  
In order to mitigate respondents’ strategic behavior, Carson and Groves (2007) 
suggest a modified multinomial choice question which changes one of the key elements in 
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the multinomial choice question. They argue that if the respondents were convinced that the 
government would provide all but one of the policy alternatives, then the respondents would 
choose their most preferred alternative (i.e., the elicitation format would be incentive 
compatible). Their modified multinomial choice question is thus based on having the 
respondents choose which alternative they most want given that all but one of the remaining 
alternatives will be provided.  
In this paper, we provide a convergent validity test of the dichotomous choice 
question, the multinomial choice question and the modified multinomial choice question by 
asking whether these elicitation question formats provide comparable welfare estimates. In 
particular, we accomplish the test with split samples where these value elicitation question 
formats are used to estimate the respondents’ WTA for adopting perennial strips on farms in 
Iowa. The incentive and informational properties embedded in these elicitation question 
formats may provide respondents with different strategic incentives in revealing their true 
preferences and thus influence the location and the precision of the estimated distributions of 
the welfare measures. We use the estimated WTA distributions from the dichotomous choice 
referendum question as a baseline to examine the influence of the incentive and 
informational properties embedded in the multinomial choice question and in the modified 
multinomial choice question on respondents’ WTA distribution in two aspects. First, since 
both the dichotomous choice question and the modified multinomial choice question are 
incentive compatible, we hypothesize that the modified multinomial choice question results 
in mean WTA’s close to the mean WTA’s derived from the dichotomous choice question. 
Second, the response from a multinomial choice question or a modified multinomial choice 
question contains more information than that from a dichotomous choice question, i.e., 
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information on the relative value between the chosen alternative and all other alternatives in 
the choice set is provided, rather than just one. Therefore, we hypothesize that the 
multinomial choice question and the modified multinomial choice question will generate 
more precisely estimated WTA distributions than the dichotomous choice question. 
Our result suggests that the multinomial choice question and the modified 
multinomial choice question produce similar WTA distributions. The mean WTA’s elicited 
from the multinomial choice question and the modified multinomial choice question are 
greater than that elicited from the dichotomous choice question. In addition, the WTA 
distribution elicited from the multinomial choice question and modified multinomial choice 
question are more dispersed than that from the dichotomous choice question.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the survey procedure 
and the value elicitation question formats employed in this study. The incentive and 
informational properties of these questions are discussed. The descriptive data summaries 
with respect to each valuation question are also provided. Section 3.3 describes the 
estimation procedures used in this study. The empirical results are provided in Section 3.4. 
Some final remarks follow in section 3.5.   
4. 2. Survey Procedure and Stated Choice Methods 
This study employs a web-based survey aimed at assessing farmers’ perceptions, 
preferences, and reactions to alternative agricultural landscapes with increased perennial land 
cover both in flat land and in rolling land in the state of Iowa.1 There is considerable interest 
in perennial crops due to their environmental benefits, particularly with respect to water 
                                                 
1 See Appendix 3 of the dissertation for a copy of the survey using the multinomial choice question format. 
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quality and wildlife habitat (Aase, Siddoway, and Black, 1985; Aase and Pikul, 1995). A link 
to the survey was put on the web page of the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
at Iowa State University from the November of 2006 through the August of 2007 
(http://www.card.iastate.edu/). The survey was also placed on the website of the Agricultural 
Marketing Resource Center from mid-November to mid-December of 2006 
(http://www.agmrc.org/agmrc/default.html). To provide an incentive for producers visiting 
the site to take the survey, the link contained information about a prize drawing. Two prizes 
of $250 each were given at the end of the survey period, randomly drawn from the survey 
respondents. To further increase the number of responses, we purchased from AgWeb.com a 
list of Iowa producers who had access to the internet and who had an e-mail address. This list 
contained 4,458 e-mail addresses, which were used to mail the survey message with the 
survey link and description of the incentive for a drawing.  
The first section of the on-line survey collected information about the respondents’ 
farming operation. The information included the respondents’ occupation in 2005, whether 
the respondent was responsible for day-to-day farming decisions, the general location of the 
farm, ownership of the farm, total acres enrolled in conservation programs, and crop rotation 
and tillage system used in the farming operation.  
Questions in the second section collected the respondents’ perceptions regarding each 
of alternative landscape scenarios2:  
∗ Status quo: No restrictions on tillage, crop rotation or any other management operation 
or practice, other than those currently required. 
                                                 
2 Copies of the pictures and accompanying text for each of the six scenarios are provided in Appendix C of this 
chapter. 
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∗ Grazing: Support partial conversion of cropland that is HEL or near streams, to pasture 
with rotational grazing. 
∗ 59 ft. cropland, 19 ft. prairie strip: Support converting HEL acres to rotating strips of 
corn and soybeans (59 ft. wide) that alternate with non-rotating perennial prairie mix 
strips (19 ft. wide) 
∗ 120 ft. cropland, 15 ft. prairie strip: Support for strips of annual crops strip (120 ft. 
wide) alternating with perennial plant strips (15 ft. wide).  
120 ft. cropland, 30 ft. prairie strip: Support for strips of annual crops strip (120 ft. wide) 
alternating with perennial plant strips (30 ft. wide). 
Native perennial cover: Support converting some or all cropland to native perennial cover, 
such as switch grass, that is harvested for biofuel. 
Respondents were asked to rate each scenario in terms of to attractiveness, profitability, 
conservation, and ease of management based on the provided images. Possible responses to 
these perception questions ranged from 1 to 7 where a “1” denoted “the least favored” and 
“7” denoted “the most favored.” For a given image, if the respondent indicated a “1” in the 
conservation perception question, this meant that the respondent perceived that the proposed 
scenario was poor for conservation. On the other hand, if the respondent indicated a “7” in 
the conservation perception question, this meant that the respondent perceived that the 
proposed scenario was good in conservation.  
The value elicitation questions in the third section assessed the respondents’ annual 
WTA to adopt the policy alternatives on their farms. The six policy alternatives were the 
same as the scenario respondents were asked to rate in the second section. Each policy 
alternative was presented with an image accompanied by a potential compensation payment 
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and a summary of the land use/farming practices. Three value elicitation question formats 
were employed in split samples to estimate the WTA distributions of the alternatives. Each 
respondent was asked to choose one alternative in either a dichotomous choice question 
format, a multinomial choice question format, or a modified multinomial choice question 
format. These scenarios were presented to the respondents in two geographies: a relatively 
flat landscape or a hilling (or rolling) landscape. The final section collected the respondents’ 
social demographic information, such as age, gender, education background, farming 
experience, and gross crop sales value in 2005.  
In this study, 199 observations were assigned dichotomous choice questions, 170 
observations were assigned modified multinomial choice questions, and 180 observations 
were assigned multinomial choice questions. In total, 549 observations were used. A brief 
discussion of the incentive and informational properties of the value elicitation question 
formats and the specific value elicitation questions used in this study is provided in the 
following subsections.     
4. 2. 1. Dichotomous Choice Question 
The dichotomous choice question has been the most widely used approach in the 
contingent valuation literature since the “take-it-or-leave-it” approach was developed by 
Bishop and Heberlein (1979). The referendum style survey, sometimes called the “close-
ended” survey, first provides the respondent the attributes of the status quo and a proposed 
scenario with a hypothetical price. The respondent is then asked whether he would 
pay/accept the proposed scenario. This approach uses a number of hypothetical prices 
randomly assigned to the respondents to bracket their WTP/WTA. In a contingent valuation 
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survey regarding a lake restoration project, for example, a respondent may be asked, “Would 
you vote ‘yes’ to the referendum to improve the water quality to the level as described here if 
the proposed project would cost you $x?”  
This method has several advantages over its “open-ended” counterpart. First, it 
simplifies the respondents’ cognitive task by asking them to make a judgment about a given 
value. It is similar to deciding whether to buy a market good at a given price. Second, this 
method is incentive compatible as it is in the respondents’ interest to reveal their true 
preferences. However, each respondent’s true valuation is an unobservable random variable 
since the respondent’s yes/no response to the dichotomous choice question only reveals 
whether his WTP/WTA is above or below the proposed bid value. Thus, this method is less 
efficient and requires a large number of observations to obtain precise WTP/WTA estimates. 
Six policy alternatives including the status quo were considered in this study. The six 
alternatives describe different agricultural land uses and compensation levels associated with 
their adoption. For each scenario, a picture of the cropping system was provided with 
information on the management practices that would accompany it. Each respondent who 
was assigned a dichotomous choice question was randomly assigned two of the six 
alternatives and was asked to choose his most preferred. Since a dichotomous choice 
question considers two alternatives at a time, in total, fifteen combinations of dichotomous 
choice questions were employed.  
The respondent was provided a brief introduction before the information and the 
potential compensation payment associated with each alternative was proposed. The Script of 
the introduction and a sample of the dichotomous choice questions are provided in Figure 4.1 
and Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.1 Introduction of the Dichotomous Choice Question 
 
Figure 4.2 A Sample of the Dichotomous Choice Question   
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 report the descriptive data summaries categorized by the 
respondents’ choice in the dichotomous choice question in the flat land scenario and in the 
rolling land scenario, respectively. On average, the respondents were about 53 years old with 
28 years of farming experience and their mean gross value of sales in 2005 was $235,600. In 
this sample, 40% of the respondents were full-time farmers in 2005, 49% of the respondents 
were college graduates, and 85% of the respondents were responsible for making the day-to-
day decisions for a farm. The variation of the total acre in the operation was large,  
Table 4.1 Descriptive Data Summary (Flat Land, Dichotomous Choice Question)  
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(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
Status 
Quo Grazing 
59 ft 
Crop,  
19 ft 
Prairie 
15 ft  
Crop,  
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft  
Crop,  
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native  
Perennial  
Cover 
Dichotomous 
Choice  
Sample 
Respondent’s 
Characteristics 
       
Age 51.77 
(10.71) 
53.82 
(13.01) 
51.92 
(13.43) 
53.57 
(11.40) 
53.97 
(9.25) 
55.72 
(10.13) 
53.37 
(11.43) 
Farm Year 28.71 
(10.84) 
28.36 
(14.44) 
24.77 
(15.05) 
26.96 
(12.25) 
29.85 
(12.24) 
29.76 
(14.21) 
28.23 
(13.35) 
Gross Value of 
Sales in 2005 
($10,000) 
25.65 
(29.19) 
22.75 
(33.43) 
15.05 
(18.43) 
25.49 
(42.62) 
26.33 
(31.01) 
25.05 
(40.71) 
23.56 
(32.66) 
Full-Time Farmer 
in 2005 
0.48 0.38 0.19 0.26 0.58 0.44 0.40 
College  0.43 0.48 0.77 0.57 0.36 0.44 0.49 
Male  0.95 0.90 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89 
Decision Maker  0.90 0.88 0.88 0.96 0.70 0.80 0.85 
Farm’s 
Characteristics 
       
Acre Total 630.47 
(619.41) 
558.22 
(599.86) 
293.32 
(304.97) 
383.85 
(460.69) 
544.30 
(520.37) 
720.88 
(1286.99) 
536.83 
(682.00) 
Acre-Crop  0.71 0.55 0.67 0.77 0.45 0.65 0.62 
Acre-CRP, WRP  0.07 0.26 0.26 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.16 
Acre-HEL  0.55 0.38 0.27 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.36 
No Tillage or Strip 
Tillage  
0.33 0.48 0.50 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.40 
Ridge Tillage  0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 
Mulch Tillage  0.31 0.18 0.27 0.30 0.15 0.20 0.23 
Conventional 
Tillage  
0.33 0.34 0.15 0.35 0.42 0.48 0.35 
N 42 50 26 23 33 25 199 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Data Summary (Rolling Land, Dichotomous Choice Question) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 Status 
Quo 
Grazing 59 ft 
Crop, 
19 ft 
Prairie 
15 ft 
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft 
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native 
Perennial 
Cover 
Dichotomous 
Choice 
Sample 
Respondent’s 
Characteristics 
       
Age 49.24 
(11.97) 
53.06 
(11.50) 
55.50 
(9.81) 
52.45 
(11.31) 
53.83 
(11.33) 
56.34 
(11.91) 
53.37 
(11.43) 
Farm Year 27.60 
(12.31) 
30.45 
(13.04) 
31.86 
(11.54) 
25.03 
(12.70) 
28.28 
(11.88) 
25.28 
(17.19) 
28.23 
(13.35) 
Gross Value of 
Sales in 2005 
($10,000) 
25.96 
(31.70) 
26.96 
(33.46) 
29.96 
(39.65) 
17.62 
(18.24) 
22.11 
(32.81) 
17.54 
(36.61) 
23.56 
(32.66) 
Full-Time Farmer 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.40 
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in 2005 (%)  
College (%) 0.37 0.51 0.50 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.49 
Male (%) 0.93 0.88 0.93 0.84 0.93 0.88 0.89 
Decision Maker 
(%) 
0.57 0.90 1.00 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.85 
Farm’s 
Characteristics 
       
Acre Total 553.60 
(667.93) 
580.78 
(820.19) 
747.36 
(931.94) 
518.65 
(485.67) 
435.42 
(421.71) 
379.14 
(536.17) 
536.83 
(682.00) 
Acre-Crop (%) 0.77 0.48 0.65 0.70 0.68 0.55 0.62 
Acre-CRP, WRP 
(%) 
0.13 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.22 0.26 0.16 
Acre-HEL (%) 0.63 0.29 0.37 0.25 0.31 0.37 0.36 
No Tillage or Strip 
Tillage (%) 
0.33 0.43 0.43 0.29 0.44 0.44 0.40 
Ridge Tillage (%) 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Mulch Tillage (%) 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.28 0.13 0.23 
Conventional 
Tillage (%) 
0.40 0.33 0.29 0.38 0.28 0.41 0.35 
N 30 49 28 31 29 32 199 
 
corresponding to the large variation of the gross sales value. Of the land in the respondents’ 
operation, on average, 62% was cropland, 16% was enrolled in the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) or Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), and 36% was highly erodible land 
(HEL). Regarding the tillage system used on the majority of the respondents’ cropland, on 
average, 40% used no tillage or strip tillage, 2% used ridge tillage, 23% used mulch tillage, 
and 35% used conventional tillage. 
Turning to the respondents’ vote in the dichotomous choice questions, the grazing 
scenario received the most votes both in the flat and rolling geographies. In addition, 
compared to the respondents who chose the other policy alternatives, the respondents who 
chose the status quo had a higher percentage of cropland in operation, a lower percentage of 
land enrolled in CRP or WRP, and a higher percentage of land in operation that was highly 
erodible.  
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Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 report the respondents’ perceptions concerning the 
attractiveness, profitability, conservation, and ease of management of each landscape 
alternative in the flat and rolling land scenarios, respectively. In both scenarios, respondents 
perceived that the status quo was the easiest in farming operation and the most profitable 
among all alternatives. Compared to the other alternatives, the status quo was less favored in 
terms of conservation. The above findings may suggest that the respondents’ current farming 
operation was cost minimizing and profit maximizing but less conservation oriented. 
4. 2. 2. Multinomial Choice Method 
In a multinomial choice question, respondents are provided a choice set containing 
more than two alternatives where each alternative is described and is associated with 
different prices. The respondents are asked to choose the most preferred alternative from the 
choice set. Similar to the dichotomous choice question, several bid prices are used for each 
alternative.  
Each respondent’s response to a multinomial choice question reveals more 
information than a dichotomous choice question. Specifically, the respondent’s answer to a 
dichotomous choice question only reveals the relative value between the chosen alternative  
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Table 4.3 Respondents’ Perceptions on Policy Alternatives (Flat Land, Dichotomous Choice Question) 
 
Status 
Quo Grazing 
59 ft  
Crop, 
19 ft 
 Prairie 
15 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native  
Perennial  
Cover 
Dichotomous 
Choice  
Sample 
Attractiveness         
Status Quo 5.52 5.28 5.23 5.35 4.91 5.08 5.25 
Grazing 5.24 5.34 5.19 4.78 4.91 5.68 5.21 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 4.64 4.94 5.04 4.61 4.64 5.72 4.90 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.05 5.34 5.62 5.48 5.00 5.56 5.30 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.90 5.36 5.65 5.39 4.97 5.88 5.31 
Native Perennial Cover 5.07 5.32 5.04 5.04 4.91 5.56 5.16 
Easy to Manage        
Status Quo 5.79 5.62 5.77 5.65 5.27 6.20 5.69 
Grazing 4.10 4.12 4.69 4.26 3.85 4.64 4.23 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 3.45 3.84 4.27 3.35 3.27 4.32 3.72 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 3.86 4.30 4.77 4.48 3.88 5.00 4.31 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.02 4.34 4.58 4.43 4.12 5.08 4.37 
Native Perennial Cover 4.98 5.40 5.31 5.13 4.82 5.92 5.24 
Conservation        
Status Quo 4.85 4.46 4.62 4.30 3.94 4.16 4.42 
Grazing 5.64 5.40 5.35 4.78 5.06 5.36 5.31 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 5.55 5.36 5.62 5.26 4.85 5.96 5.41 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.67 5.40 5.54 5.17 4.79 5.52 5.36 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.64 5.42 5.42 5.26 4.91 5.76 5.41 
Native Perennial Cover 5.95 5.92 5.58 5.70 5.58 6.16 5.83 
Profit        
Status Quo 5.76 5.60 6.19 5.65 5.30 5.92 5.71 
Grazing 4.71 4.66 5.04 4.17 4.67 5.16 4.73 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 3.95 4.28 4.69 3.57 3.79 4.92 4.18 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.67 4.98 5.31 4.96 4.42 5.48 4.92 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.57 4.96 5.08 5.00 4.45 5.48 4.88 
Native Perennial Cover 4.48 4.48 4.85 3.65 4.09 4.96 4.43 
∗ Possible responses to these perception questions ranged from 1 to 7 where a “1” denoted “the least 
favored” and “7” denoted “the most favored.” 
 
 
and a second alternative. On the other hand, the respondent’s response to a multinomial 
choice question provides the relative values between the chosen one and other alternatives. 
and a second alternative. On the other hand, the respondent’s response to a multinomial 
choice question provides the relative values between the chosen one and other alternatives. 
However, this advantage comes with a price. The multinomial choice question 
provides respondents more choices, and thus more information, which requires more 
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Table 4.4 Respondents’ Perceptions on Policy Alternatives (Rolling Land, Dichotomous Choice Question) 
 
Status 
Quo Grazing 
59 ft  
Crop, 
19 ft 
 Prairie 
15 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native  
Perennial  
Cover 
Dichotomous 
Choice  
Sample 
Attractiveness         
Status Quo 4.97 4.88 4.32 5.42 5.45 4.53 4.92 
Grazing 5.10 5.76 5.82 5.74 5.48 5.44 5.57 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 4.53 5.41 5.68 5.48 5.31 5.34 5.30 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.00 5.49 5.32 5.61 5.45 5.34 5.38 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.00 5.51 5.43 5.81 5.52 5.22 5.42 
Native Perennial Cover 4.70 5.31 5.36 5.06 4.97 5.19 5.12 
Easy to Manage        
Status Quo 5.20 5.31 5.32 5.16 5.38 4.78 5.20 
Grazing 4.23 4.90 4.54 4.39 4.48 4.16 4.49 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 3.03 3.98 4.29 3.61 3.38 3.63 3.68 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 3.37 4.27 4.21 3.71 3.83 3.50 3.85 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 3.93 4.39 4.61 4.32 4.07 4.13 4.25 
Native Perennial Cover 4.83 5.20 5.21 4.97 4.76 5.09 5.03 
Conservation        
Status Quo 4.00 4.22 3.54 4.03 4.34 3.78 4.01 
Grazing 5.53 5.78 5.86 6.10 5.58 5.38 5.71 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 5.30 5.90 5.79 5.90 5.48 5.47 5.66 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.53 5.80 5.50 5.77 5.38 5.34 5.58 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.40 5.84 5.64 5.90 5.55 5.38 5.64 
Native Perennial Cover 5.37 5.88 6.00 5.94 5.72 5.63 5.76 
Profit        
Status Quo 5.53 5.35 5.04 5.26 5.45 4.94 5.27 
Grazing 4.07 4.84 4.89 4.19 4.31 4.28 4.46 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 3.67 4.67 4.64 4.32 4.21 4.53 4.37 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.47 5.10 5.18 4.71 4.76 4.84 4.86 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.47 5.04 5.04 4.94 4.79 4.66 4.84 
Native Perennial Cover 3.93 4.47 4.64 4.13 3.79 4.13 4.21 
∗ Possible responses to these perception questions ranged from 1 to 7 where a “1” denoted “the least 
favored” and “7” denoted “the most favored.” 
 
cognitive effort from respondents. More importantly, this method is not incentive compatible. 
In particular, the theoretical result from the voting literature regarding multinomial choice 
using plurality rule suggests that, from a respondent’s point of view, a multinomial choice 
question can reduce to a dichotomous choice question between the two alternatives that the 
respondent believes will receive the most votes independent of his vote. Therefore, if a 
respondent believes that the government will provide the alternative which receives the most 
votes in the choice set, he will then strategically pick his optimal choice depending on his 
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conjecture of the other respondents’ choices. In this case, a respondent reveals his preferred 
choice, conditional on the other respondents’ preference. 
For example, as shown in Table 4.5, Thomas, Belinda, and Ruth are assigned to 
choose one of the three alternatives, A, B, and C. Suppose that the sequence of Thomas’s 
preference order is A, B, then C; Belinda’s preference order is B, C, then A; Ruth’s 
preference order is C, A, then B. Suppose also that Thomas perceives that the government 
will provide the alternative which receives the most votes. If Thomas believes that Belinda 
would vote for B and Ruth would vote for C, then Thomas would vote for B. In this case, 
Thomas reveals his vote conditional on his belief about Belinda’s and Ruth’s preferences. 
 
Table 4.5 An Example for Multinomial Choice Question 
 Thomas Belinda Ruth 
1 A B C 
2 B C A 
3 C A B 
 
Before presenting the respondents the multinomial choice question regarding the 
attributes and bid value associated with each policy alternative, we provided respondents a 
brief introduction about the multinomial choice question. Specifically, each respondent was 
told to consider how much compensation he would need in implementing each practice on 
his farm each year and then select the one single alternative he would most like to see offered 
in the next farm bill. The script of the introduction and a sample of the multinomial choice 
question are provided in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, respectively. 
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Figure 4.3 Introduction of the Dichotomous Choice Question 
 
Figure 4.4 A Sample of the Multinomial Choice Question 
 
The descriptive data summaries categorized by the respondents’ choice to the 
multinomial choice question for flat rolling land scenarios are provided in Table 4.6 and 
Table 4.7. On average, the respondents were about 52 years old with 27 years of farming 
experience. Their mean gross value of sales in 2005 was $253,700. In this sample, 53% of  
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Table 4.6 Descriptive Data Summary (Flat Land, Multinomial Choice Question) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
Status 
Quo Grazing 
59 ft 
Crop, 
19 ft 
Prairie 
15 ft 
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft 
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native  
Perennial  
Cover 
Multinomial  
Choice  
Sample 
Respondent’s 
Characteristics 
       
Age 52.13 
(11.46) 
51.75 
(12.24) 
50.81 
(7.91) 
49.27 
(12.48) 
56.06 
(9.15) 
52.30 
(10.44) 
52.14 
(10.92) 
Farm Year 31.00 
(12.59) 
28.52 
(13.73) 
20.25 
(12.90) 
23.45 
(14.00) 
27.75 
(16.27) 
24.65 
(11.74) 
26.82 
(13.33) 
Gross Value of 
Sales in 2005 
($10,000) 
42.22 
(39.85) 
25.06 
(23.62) 
15.86 
(23.76) 
18.18 
(14.70) 
15.94 
(19.08) 
20.12 
(28.00) 
25.37 
(29.81) 
Full-Time Farmer 
in 2005 
0.68 0.59 0.25 0.45 0.31 0.43 0.53 
College (%) 0.48 0.39 0.81 0.55 0.50 0.62 0.50 
Male (%) 0.93 0.93 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.95 
Decision Maker 
(%) 
0.93 0.68 0.75 1.00 0.81 0.91 0.84 
Farm’s 
Characteristics 
       
Acre Total 824.13 
(767.13) 
763.07 
(996.27) 
306.56 
(352.47) 
401.18 
(348.63) 
463.25 
(425.67) 
445.02 
(656.51) 
593.64 
(748.92) 
Acre-Crop (%) 0.86 0.72 0.63 0.80 0.73 0.61 0.71 
Acre-CRP, WRP 
(%) 
0.05 0.13 0.21 0.03 0.14 0.26 0.15 
Acre-HEL (%) 0.36 0.29 0.38 0.25 0.26 0.51 0.37 
No Tillage or Strip 
Tillage (%) 
0.45 0.39 0.50 0.55 0.25 0.38 0.41 
Ridge Tillage (%) 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.02 
Mulch Tillage (%) 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.19 0.15 0.21 
Conventional 
Tillage (%) 
0.32 0.30 0.25 0.18 0.50 0.45 0.36 
N 40 44 16 11 16 53 180 
 
respondents were full-time farmers in 2005, 50% of the respondents were college graduates, 
and 84% of the respondents were responsible for making the day-to-day decisions for a farm. 
The size of the farms varied. In general, of the land in operation, 71% was cropland, 15% 
was enrolled in CRP or WRP, and 35% was highly erodible land. Regarding the tillage 
system employed on the respondents’ cropland, on average, 41% used no tillage or strip 
tillage, 2% used ridge tillage, 21% used mulch tillage, and 36% used conventional tillage.  
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Table 4.7 Descriptive Data Summary (Rolling Land, Multinomial Choice Question) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
Status 
Quo Grazing 
59 ft 
Crop, 
19 ft 
Prairie 
15 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native  
Perennial 
Cover 
Multinomial 
Choice  
Sample 
Respondent’s 
Characteristics 
       
Age 49.36 
(10.01) 
53.71 
(11.54) 
47.89 
(9.35) 
55.00 
(14.74) 
53.10 
(11.91) 
52.43 
(9.92) 
52.14 
(10.92) 
Farm Year 27.44 
(12.36) 
29.10 
(13.07) 
20.78 
(9.78) 
29.00 
(18.80) 
24.86 
(15.80) 
25.90 
(12.48) 
26.82 
(13.33) 
Gross Value of Sales 
in 2005 ($10,000) 
38.54 
(37.44) 
18.56 
(19.75) 
19.03 
(25.32) 
29.20 
(26.82) 
24.82 
(34.46) 
22.93 
(28.88) 
25.37 
(29.81) 
Full-Time Farmer in 
2005 (%)  
0.75 0.51 0.33 0.36 0.33 0.45 0.53 
College (%) 0.44 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.53 0.50 
Male (%) 0.92 0.93 1.00 0.91 1.00 0.97 0.95 
Decision Maker (%) 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.82 0.24 0.86 0.84 
Farm’s 
Characteristics 
       
Acre Total 814.72 
(696.28) 
492.02 
(452.97) 
254.22 
(334.86) 
677.09 
(498.85) 
596.24 
(794.47) 
571.17 
(982.52) 
593.64 
(748.92) 
Acre-Crop (%) 0.77 0.69 0.62 0.74 0.79 0.67 0.71 
Acre-CRP, WRP (%) 0.08 0.11 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.22 0.15 
Acre-HEL (%) 0.39 0.35 0.56 0.31 0.22 0.41 0.37 
No Tillage or Strip 
Tillage (%) 
0.44 0.51 0.44 0.55 0.29 0.31 0.41 
Ridge Tillage (%) 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Mulch Tillage (%) 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.29 0.21 0.21 
Conventional Tillage 
(%) 
0.27 0.24 0.33 0.27 0.33 0.47 0.36 
N 36 45 9 11 21 58 180 
 
Overall, the respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics and farming operation characteristics 
are similar to those assigned in the dichotomous choice question sample. 
In this sample, the “native perennial cover”, the “grazing”, and the “status quo” 
scenarios were chosen over 75% of the time in both scenarios. In particular, the “native 
perennial cover” received about 30% of the votes, the “grazing” received about 25% of the 
votes, and the “status quo” received about 20% of the votes. In addition, the respondents who 
chose the “status quo” had a higher percentage of cropland and a lower percentage of land 
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enrolled in CRP or WRP in their operation. The respondents who chose the “native perennial 
cover” had a percentage of lower cropland and a higher percentage of land enrolled in CRP 
or WRP in their operation. 
The respondents’ perceptions regarding attractiveness, ease of management, 
conservation, and profitability of each alternative are reported in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9. In 
general, the respondents’ perceptions with respect to these aspects in the multinomial choice 
question sample were similar to those assigned in the dichotomous choice question sample.  
Table 4.8 Respondents’ Perceptions on Policy Alternatives (Flat Land, Multinomial Choice Question) 
 
Status 
Quo Grazing 
59 ft  
Crop, 
19 ft 
 Prairie 
15 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native  
Perennial  
Cover 
Multinomial 
Choice  
Sample 
Attractiveness         
Status Quo 5.98 5.39 4.19 4.82 5.63 5.38 5.39 
Grazing 5.45 5.39 5.25 5.18 5.56 5.42 5.40 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 4.15 4.70 5.69 4.09 5.50 5.28 4.87 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.08 5.07 5.56 5.18 5.56 5.28 5.23 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.08 4.91 6.00 5.45 5.88 5.51 5.34 
Native Perennial Cover 4.78 5.09 5.94 4.91 5.63 5.75 5.33 
Easy to Manage        
Status Quo 6.03 5.77 5.88 5.91 6.06 5.75 5.87 
Grazing 3.73 4.59 4.06 4.73 5.00 4.66 4.42 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 2.85 3.52 4.13 3.45 4.19 3.96 3.61 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 3.75 3.82 4.50 3.64 4.25 4.17 3.99 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 3.83 4.02 4.38 3.82 4.94 4.43 4.20 
Native Perennial Cover 4.45 5.49 5.31 5.36 5.63 5.83 5.34 
Conservation        
Status Quo 5.25 4.57 3.38 3.91 4.75 4.47 4.56 
Grazing 4.85 5.64 4.88 5.00 5.13 5.66 5.32 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 4.73 5.64 5.75 5.64 6.13 5.92 5.57 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.05 5.45 5.25 5.36 5.38 5.53 5.36 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.18 5.39 5.31 5.00 5.81 5.64 5.42 
Native Perennial Cover 5.60 5.95 5.88 6.09 6.38 6.40 6.04 
Profit        
Status Quo 6.15 5.93 5.38 5.91 6.06 5.94 5.94 
Grazing 4.40 4.84 5.00 4.64 4.94 4.74 4.72 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 3.23 3.77 5.06 3.82 4.50 4.23 3.97 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.53 4.75 5.44 4.82 5.31 5.08 4.91 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.48 4.75 5.25 4.82 5.50 4.81 4.82 
Native Perennial Cover 4.10 4.45 5.13 4.09 4.75 4.98 4.59 
∗ Possible responses to these perception questions ranged from 1 to 7 where a “1” denoted “the least 
favored” and “7” denoted “the most favored.” 
 101
Table 4.9 Respondents’ Perceptions on Policy Alternatives (Rolling Land, Multinomial Choice Question) 
 
Status 
Quo Grazing 
59 ft  
Crop, 
19 ft 
 Prairie 
15 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native  
Perennial  
Cover 
Multinomial 
Choice  
Sample 
Attractiveness         
Status Quo 5.75 5.07 4.44 5.45 5.14 5.05 5.20 
Grazing 5.36 6.04 6.00 5.55 4.57 5.91 5.66 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 4.31 5.22 5.78 4.91 4.19 5.66 5.07 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.20 5.42 6.00 6.27 4.76 5.72 5.48 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.22 5.58 5.78 6.18 4.57 5.72 5.48 
Native Perennial Cover 4.33 5.18 5.89 5.27 4.95 5.67 5.18 
Easy to Manage        
Status Quo 5.78 5.69 5.67 5.18 5.90 5.57 5.66 
Grazing 3.95 5.33 5.11 4.73 3.62 4.71 4.61 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 2.33 3.84 4.11 3.00 2.19 3.95 3.34 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 2.78 4.13 4.89 4.27 2.95 4.09 3.76 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 3.31 4.49 4.44 4.64 3.48 4.33 4.09 
Native Perennial Cover 4.22 5.09 5.78 5.73 5.43 5.72 5.23 
Conservation        
Status Quo 4.95 4.07 3.56 4.45 4.24 4.03 4.25 
Grazing 5.31 6.07 6.00 5.64 5.14 6.03 5.77 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 5.03 5.62 6.00 5.82 4.95 6.14 5.62 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.45 5.62 5.67 6.09 4.81 6.02 5.65 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.39 5.89 5.00 6.36 5.05 6.00 5.71 
Native Perennial Cover 5.53 5.89 6.33 6.27 6.10 6.41 6.06 
Profit        
Status Quo 5.89 5.49 5.00 5.55 5.57 5.66 5.61 
Grazing 3.89 5.20 4.89 3.82 3.62 4.64 4.47 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 3.31 4.49 5.22 4.18 3.43 4.66 4.20 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.39 5.13 5.56 5.55 4.29 5.16 4.94 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.08 5.02 5.22 5.09 4.19 4.97 4.73 
Native Perennial Cover 3.72 4.04 5.22 4.73 4.00 4.84 4.33 
∗ Possible responses to these perception questions ranged from 1 to 7 where a “1” denoted “the least 
favored” and “7” denoted “the most favored.” 
 
 
Specifically, the respondents believed that the “status quo” was the easiest and the most 
profitable farming operation among all alternatives. The conservation ability of the “status 
quo” was the lowest among all alternatives. 
4. 2. 3. CGM Multinomial Choice Method 
Concerning the respondent’s potential strategic voting behavior in answering a 
multinomial choice question, Carson and Groves (2007) argue that if a respondent only uses 
one of the alternatives and is convinced that the government will provide all but one of the 
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alternatives, he should choose his favorite, i.e., reveal his true preference. That is, by 
convincing the respondent that all but one of the alternatives will be provided, the modified 
multinomial choice question reduces to a dichotomous choice question, i.e., the respondent 
votes for his most preferred alternative against the other alternatives competing for the 
alternative that will not be offered. The worst case for an individual is that his second best 
choice is provided but not the best. In order to increase the likelihood of his best choice being 
provided, his dominant strategy is to reveal his true preference.  
Suppose that the water quality in six lakes is considered to be restored. If the 
respondent will use only one of the lakes and believes that the government will clean five out 
of the six lakes, his dominant strategy is to vote for his most preferred choice (reveal his true 
preference). In a contingent valuation survey, for example, a respondent may be asked, 
“Consider a water quality improvement project and the potential payment described. If the 
government would implement the lake restoration projects in only five of the six lakes, 
please select the one single lake you would like most to implement the water quality 
improvement project.”  
Similar to a multinomial choice question, a modified multinomial choice question 
collects more information about the respondents’ relative value between the chosen 
alternative and the other alternatives than a dichotomous choice question. A modified 
multinomial choice question also shares the same disadvantage of a multinomial choice 
question, i.e., more cognitive effort is required in answering a modified multinomial choice 
question. However, the modified multinomial choice question has an advantage over the 
multinomial choice question; namely that the respondent’s answer to the modified 
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multinomial choice question should not depend on his conjecture about the other 
respondents’ votes and the respondent’s dominant strategy is to vote for his favorite. 
As shown in Figure 4.5, each respondent a brief introduction before the alternatives 
were proposed. Each respondent was told that five of the six alternatives would be offered, 
and the respondent was then asked to select the alternative he would most like to have 
included in the five alternatives. A sample of the modified multinomial choice question is 
provided in Figure 4.6.  
Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 report the descriptive data summaries categorized by the 
respondents’ choice in the modified multinomial choice question for the flat land and rolling 
land scenarios, respectively. On average, the respondents were about 52 years old with over 
30 years of farming experience and their mean gross value of sales in 2005 was $167,600. In 
this sample, 41% of the respondents were full-time farmers in 2005, 46% of the respondents 
were college graduates, and 90% of the respondents were responsible for making the day-to-
day decisions for a farm. The variation of the total acre in operation was large which was 
corresponding to the large variation of the gross sales value. Of the land in the respondents’ 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Introduction of the Modified Multinomial Choice Question 
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Figure 4.6 A Sample of the Modified Multinomial Choice Question 
 
operation, on average, 67% was cropland, 11% was enrolled in the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) or Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), and 27% was highly erodible land 
(HEL). Regarding the tillage system used on the majority of the respondents’ cropland, on 
average, 42% used no tillage or strip tillage, 1% used ridge tillage, 20% used mulch tillage, 
and 36% used conventional tillage. Overall, the respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics 
and farming operation characteristics are similar to those assigned in the dichotomous choice 
question sample and the multinomial choice question sample. 
Turning to the respondents’ vote in the modified multinomial choice questions, the 
“grazing” and the “native perennial cover” received the most votes in both scenarios. 
Specifically, the “native perennial cover” received about 35% of the votes in flat land and 
33% in rolling land. The “grazing” received about 26% of the votes in flat land and 21% in  
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Table 4.10 Descriptive Data Summary (Flat Land, Modified Multinomial Choice Question) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
Status 
Quo Grazing 
59 ft 
Crop, 
19 ft 
Prairie 
15 ft 
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft 
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native 
Perennial 
Cover 
Modified 
Multinomial 
Choice 
Sample 
Respondent’s 
Characteristics 
       
Age 52.40 
(14.01) 
50.16 
(10.19) 
53.27 
(12.38) 
48.55 
(7.62) 
52.33 
(10.08) 
54.30 
(11.99) 
52.28 
(11.49) 
Farm Year 31.16 
(14.82) 
26.76 
(12.43) 
20.27 
(12.99) 
21.27 
(10.22) 
26.44 
(12.10) 
37.60 
(69.36) 
30.42 
(42.63) 
Gross Value of 
Sales in 2005 
($10,000) 
26.95 
(33.36) 
19.14 
(17.57) 
8.07 
(6.53) 
12.50 
(17.72) 
17.01 
(21.74) 
13.04 
(14.52) 
16.76 
(20.21) 
Full-Time Farmer 
in 2005 
0.60 0.60 0.18 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.41 
College (%) 0.36 0.51 0.64 0.64 0.50 0.38 0.46 
Male (%) 0.96 0.93 0.82 1.00 0.89 0.85 0.90 
Decision Maker 
(%) 
0.84 1.00 0.82 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.90 
Farm’s 
Characteristics 
       
Acre Total 621.29 
(549.69) 
469.76 
(459.69) 
245.00 
(285.13) 
428.85 
(622.45) 
404.67 
(587.92) 
320.52 
(373.22) 
415.29 
(470.35) 
Acre-Crop (%) 0.81 0.72 0.53 0.74 0.68 0.59 0.67 
Acre-CRP, WRP 
(%) 
0.05 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.11 
Acre-HEL (%) 0.23 0.40 0.10 0.24 0.15 0.25 0.27 
No Tillage or Strip 
Tillage (%) 
0.40 0.38 0.55 0.36 0.50 0.43 0.42 
Ridge Tillage (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 
Mulch Tillage (%) 0.16 0.24 0.18 0.27 0.11 0.20 0.20 
Conventional 
Tillage (%) 
0.44 0.38 0.27 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.36 
N 25 45 11 11 18 60 170 
 
rolling land. Compared to the respondents who chose the other policy alternatives, the 
respondents who chose the status quo had a higher percentage of cropland in operation and a 
lower percentage of land enrolled in CRP or WRP. These results are similar to those assigned 
in the dichotomous choice question sample and the multinomial choice question sample. 
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Table 4.11 Descriptive Data Summary (Rolling Land, Modified Multinomial Choice Question) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
Status 
Quo Grazing 
59 ft 
Crop, 
19 ft 
Prairie 
15 ft 
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft 
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native 
Perennial 
Cover 
Modified 
Multinomial 
Choice 
Sample 
Respondent’s 
Characteristics 
       
Age 50.45 
(13.11) 
53.33 
(13.71) 
54.91 
(11.25) 
47.77 
(10.55) 
50.32 
(8.99) 
53.96 
(10.84) 
52.28 
(11.49) 
Farm Year 31.05 
(14.52) 
28.78 
(15.72) 
25.45 
(12.04) 
21.31 
(11.38) 
27.18 
(12.00) 
27.39 
(13.38) 
30.42 
(42.63) 
Gross Value of 
Sales in 2005 
($10,000) 
31.50 
(35.88) 
14.34 
(15.75) 
19.20 
(22.12) 
18.37 
(20.30) 
14.38 
(16.22) 
13.66 
(14.77) 
16.76 
(20.21) 
Full-Time Farmer 
in 2005 (%)  
0.55 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.38 0.32 0.41 
College (%) 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.46 
Male (%) 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.92 0.88 0.84 0.90 
Decision Maker 
(%) 
0.90 0.92 1.00 0.85 0.91 0.88 0.90 
Farm’s 
Characteristics 
       
Acre Total 703.86 
(576.13) 
421.81 
(559.75) 
348.64 
(333.73) 
665.23 
(804.59) 
301.03 
(273.68) 
332.47 
(313.50) 
415.29 
(470.35) 
Acre-Crop (%) 0.80 0.63 0.63 0.79 0.72 0.60 0.67 
Acre-CRP, WRP 
(%) 
0.06 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.14 0.11 
Acre-HEL (%) 0.27 0.33 0.43 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.27 
No Tillage or Strip 
Tillage (%) 
0.45 0.44 0.64 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.42 
Ridge Tillage (%) 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Mulch Tillage (%) 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.16 0.20 
Conventional 
Tillage (%) 
0.40 0.33 0.09 0.38 0.35 0.43 0.36 
N 20 36 11 13 34 56 170 
 
Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 report the respondents’ perceptions concerning 
attractiveness, profitability, conservation, and ease of management of each landscape 
alternative in flat land and in rolling land, respectively. In general, in either flat or rolling 
lands, the respondents perceived that the status quo was better in management and in 
profitability than other alternatives. Again, compared to the other alternatives, the status quo 
was rated as poor in terms of conservation.  
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Table 4.12 Respondents’ Perceptions on Policy Alternatives  
(Flat Land, Modified Multinomial Choice Question) 
 
Status 
Quo Grazing 
59 ft  
Crop, 
19 ft 
 Prairie 
15 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native  
Perennial  
Cover 
Modified  
Multinomial 
Choice 
Sample 
Attractiveness         
Status Quo 5.84 5.44 4.82 5.18 5.28 5.50 5.45 
Grazing 5.36 5.44 5.09 5.82 5.67 5.53 5.49 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 4.72 4.96 5.27 4.91 5.78 5.38 5.18 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.16 5.31 5.91 5.64 5.78 5.78 5.56 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.32 5.20 5.82 5.55 6.11 5.57 5.51 
Native Perennial Cover 5.24 5.11 5.18 5.00 5.50 5.85 5.43 
Easy to Manage        
Status Quo 5.80 5.69 5.64 5.82 5.56 5.52 5.64 
Grazing 4.32 4.44 5.09 4.36 4.56 4.42 4.46 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 3.00 3.40 4.27 4.00 4.11 4.17 3.78 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 3.60 4.11 4.00 4.55 4.61 4.58 4.28 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 3.44 4.04 4.27 4.64 4.44 4.75 4.30 
Native Perennial Cover 5.12 5.31 6.00 6.09 5.67 5.72 5.56 
Conservation        
Status Quo 5.20 4.44 4.00 3.36 4.56 4.63 4.54 
Grazing 5.28 5.47 5.27 6.09 5.06 5.45 5.42 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 5.68 5.44 6.00 5.55 5.89 5.78 5.69 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.40 5.58 6.09 5.91 5.61 5.73 5.66 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.56 5.40 6.36 5.91 6.00 5.60 5.65 
Native Perennial Cover 4.32 4.91 5.45 5.27 5.06 5.08 4.96 
Profit        
Status Quo 5.84 5.78 6.18 5.73 5.78 5.95 5.87 
Grazing 4.64 4.84 5.00 5.18 5.06 5.05 4.94 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 3.72 4.24 5.09 4.36 4.39 4.55 4.35 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.48 4.96 5.27 5.45 5.00 5.17 5.02 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.80 5.67 6.27 6.09 5.94 6.30 6.01 
Native Perennial Cover 4.32 4.47 5.45 4.91 4.61 4.90 4.71 
∗ Possible responses to these perception questions ranged from 1 to 7 where a “1” denoted “the least 
favored” and “7” denoted “the most favored.” 
 
In sum, the respondents’ social demographic characteristics and their farming 
characteristics were similar across the three samples answering the dichotomous choice 
question, the multinomial choice question, and the modified multinomial choice question. In 
addition, the respondents’ perceptions regarding attractiveness, ease of management, 
conservation, and profitability with respect to each alternative were similar. In particular, the 
respondents perceived that the “status quo” was the easiest to manage and the most profitable 
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Table 4.13 Respondents’ Perceptions on Policy Alternatives  
(Rolling Land, Modified Multinomial Choice Question) 
 
Status 
Quo Grazing 
59 ft  
Crop, 
19 ft 
 Prairie 
15 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
30 ft  
Crop, 
120 ft 
Prairie 
Native  
Perennial  
Cover 
Modified  
Multinomial 
Choice 
Sample 
Attractiveness         
Status Quo 5.85 5.08 4.64 5.85 4.56 5.12 5.11 
Grazing 5.70 6.22 5.73 5.77 5.74 5.75 5.84 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 5.70 6.22 5.73 5.77 5.74 5.75 5.84 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.70 5.89 5.45 5.85 5.88 5.71 5.78 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.80 5.75 6.09 5.62 5.94 5.80 5.82 
Native Perennial Cover 5.10 5.03 5.64 5.00 5.35 5.64 5.34 
Easy to Manage        
Status Quo 5.60 5.42 5.45 5.23 5.56 5.36 5.44 
Grazing 4.35 5.06 5.00 4.46 4.82 4.62 4.74 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 4.35 5.06 5.00 4.46 4.82 4.62 4.74 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 3.50 4.25 3.64 3.69 4.09 3.93 3.94 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 3.85 4.33 4.27 3.92 4.47 4.30 4.26 
Native Perennial Cover 5.10 5.17 5.55 5.31 5.38 5.64 5.39 
Conservation        
Status Quo 4.55 4.33 4.18 3.77 3.82 4.18 4.15 
Grazing 5.65 6.31 6.18 5.85 5.88 5.73 5.91 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 5.65 6.31 6.18 5.85 5.88 5.73 5.91 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.95 6.06 6.00 6.08 6.12 5.91 6.01 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 5.80 5.97 6.45 5.92 5.94 5.88 5.94 
Native Perennial Cover 6.00 5.72 6.27 6.08 6.03 6.14 6.02 
Profit        
Status Quo 5.90 5.44 5.36 5.69 5.47 5.71 5.61 
Grazing 3.90 5.33 5.36 4.54 4.68 4.55 4.72 
59 ft Crop, 19 ft Prairie 3.90 5.33 5.36 4.54 4.68 4.55 4.72 
15 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.45 5.33 5.36 4.69 5.18 4.93 5.02 
30 ft Crop, 120 ft Prairie 4.50 5.17 5.64 4.77 5.35 5.12 5.11 
Native Perennial Cover 3.75 4.94 4.91 4.00 4.18 4.50 4.43 
∗ Possible responses to these perception questions ranged from 1 to 7 where a “1” denoted “the least 
favored” and “7” denoted “the most favored.” 
 
among the six alternatives. However, the “status quo” was rated to lowest in terms of 
conservation among the six alternatives.   
4. 3. Estimation Approaches and Associated Posterior Simulators 
In this study, we use three value elicitation question formats to elicit the respondents’ 
WTA to the proposed five policy alternatives. In particular, for the dichotomous choice 
question, we use the traditional bid function model suggested by Cameron (1988) to estimate 
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the value of the chosen alternative relative to the other alternative. We proposed an 
estimation procedure to estimate the responses jointly from the fifteen pairs of alternatives. 
   In a similar fashion, Cameron’s argument can be extended to the multinomial 
choice context. Specifically, the bid values included in the valuation question can be used to 
bracket the respondents’ WTA in multinomial choice question, we propose an estimation 
procedure that can separately identify every coefficient in this model.   
4. 3. 1. A Joint Estimation Procedure for Multiple Dichotomous Choice Surveys: A 
Bayesian Approach 
The most cited modeling strategy in a discrete choice model is the random utility 
maximization (RUM) model developed by McFadden (1974). Using the RUM model, 
Hanemann (1984) constructs the basic model rationalizing the response in a dichotomous 
choice question for welfare analysis. Cameron (1988) argues that the dichotomous choice 
referendum applied in contingent valuation is similar to the commuters’ choices between bus 
and car mode of transportation, but contains more information. In a contingent valuation 
survey, an individual is provided two alternatives, usually one of them is the status quo, and 
is asked to choose the alternative which produces the highest utility. While the threshold 
values of the latent variables are not observable in a probit model, the threshold values of the 
latent variables in the dichotomous choice referendum data are observable. Taking advantage 
of the variance of the hypothetical bid values across the individuals, direct and separate point 
estimates of regression coefficients and standard deviation can be estimated. 
In a WTA context, an individual’s WTA can be written as: 
 i i iw υ= +x γ  (4.1) 
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where ix is a vector of his social-economic characteristics, γ  is a vector of corresponding 
parameters, and iυ is assumed independently and identically distributed with a normal 
distribution. The observed dichotomous choice survey response then indicates whether the 
individual’s WTA is greater than or less than the offered bid value, ib ; i.e., 
 
1,     if  
0,     otherwise
i i
i
w b
y
<⎧= ⎨⎩  (4.2) 
Assuming that ( )2~ 0,iidi Nυ σ , the probability of yes for an individual can be written as: 
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 (4.3) 
The coefficients of the model to be estimated are those associated with the variables ix  (i.e., 
γ ) and the coefficient on the offered compensation ib , which provides an estimate of 1 σ .   
There are six policy alternatives including the status quo considered in this study. 
Each individual who received a dichotomous choice question was randomly provided two of 
the six alternatives and asked to choose which of the two alternatives produced the highest 
utility. Therefore, fifteen versions of dichotomous choice questions were applied in split 
samples.  
The responses from the fifteen samples were used to jointly estimate individuals’ 
WTA’s for the five proposed policy alternatives relative to the status quo. In particular, 
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choosing alternative 0 as the status quo, an individual’s WTA for each policy alternative 
relative to the status quo is defined as: 
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β
β
β
 (4.4) 
where ix  is a vector of explanatory variables and we assume that 
 ( )1
5
0,
i
i
i
N
ε
ε
ε
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= Σ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
# ∼  (4.5) 
where Σ  is a 5 5× positive definite matrix with off-diagonal element denoted jkσ  and the 
thj  diagonal element denoted 2jσ .   
In the case of a single dichotomous choice question, an individual is provided two 
alternatives each with a threshold bid value. Although the respondent’s true WTA is not 
observed, his WTA can be manifested through his discrete choice indicator, iy . For example, 
if an individual is asked to choose between the status quo and policy alternative j, his vote 
reveals his WTA for option j relative to the status quo as follows 
 
,     if  
0,     otherwise
ij ij
i
j w b
y
<⎧⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
 (4.6) 
Similarly, if policy alternative j and k are offered for an individual to choose between, his 
vote to the dichotomous choice question reveals his WTA for option j and k relative to the 
status quo as 
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,     if  
,     otherwise                  
ij ij ik ik
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j b w b w
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 (4.7) 
The parameters of our model we estimated using a Bayesian approach with data 
augmentation and Gibbs sampling. In the current setting, the augmented variable is the 
individuals’ unobserved WTA’s for each alternative relative to the status quo. The posterior 
simulator for the dichotomous choice question is fully described in the appendix. In brief, 
under prior independence, the joint posterior distribution is represented as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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                     | , , | ,
N
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i
p y p y p p p
p p p y p
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where  
 [ ] [ ]1 5 1 5 and w w= =w … …β β β  (4.9) 
The product term comes from the assumed (conditional) independence across observations. 
In particular, if, for example, the respondent is assigned to choose between alternative j and 
alternative k, the first term on the right-hand side of the product is  
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 (4.10) 
with ( ).I denoting the standard indicator function.  
The posterior simulator involves drawing sequentially from the conditional posterior 
distributions for iw , β , and Σ . Apart from the prior distributions, the remaining piece in our 
joint posterior distribution follows immediately from our normality assumption 
 ( )| , ~ ,iidi iNΣ Σw xβ β  (4.11) 
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This model is completed by choosing prior distributions of the forms: 
 ( ) ( )( )11,  and ,N V W Rρ ρ−−Σ∼ ∼ββ β  (4.12) 
4. 3. 2. Estimation Procedure for the Multinomial Choice Question and the Modified 
Multinomial Choice Question: A Bayesian Approach 
Extending the willingness to pay model for the dichotomous choice question 
suggested by Cameron (1988), we propose an estimation method using the variance of the 
hypothetical bid values embedded in the multinomial choice question across the individuals 
to identify the regression coefficients and standard deviation for the multinomial choice 
question and the modified multinomial choice question. Specifically, each individual who 
received a multinomial choice question or a modified multinomial choice question was asked 
to choose one of the six alternatives that produced the highest utility. again, letting alternative 
0 denote the status quo, an individual’s WTA for each policy alternative relative to the status 
quo can be defined as: 
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where ix  is a vector of explanatory variables and we assume that 
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5
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where Σ  is a 5×5 positive definite matrix with off-diagonal element denoted jkσ  and the 
thj  diagonal element denoted 2jσ . Through an individual’s discrete choice indicator, iy , his 
true WTA is revealed as 
 { }
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,     if max 0
ji ji
i
ji ji ki ki
j
b w j
y k b w b w
=
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 (4.15) 
The probability for an individual choosing alternative j is: 
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As long as each of the alternatives is chosen by at least one individual, all of the coefficient 
of the variance-covariance matrix, Σ , and the coefficients of the explanatory variables, β , 
can be separately identified.   
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As was the case with our analysis of the dichotomous choice referendum, a Gibbs 
sampler with data augmentation is used to characterize the posterior distribution of the 
parameters of interest. The posterior simulator is fully described in the appendix. The 
posterior distribution of the bid function model involves adding the latent WTA variables to 
the joint posterior distribution. Under prior independence, the joint posterior distribution is 
represented as: 
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where the product term comes from the assumed (conditional) independence across 
observations. The first term on the right-hand side of the product is  
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with ( ).I  denoting the standard indicator function. Apart from the prior distributions, the 
remaining piece in our joint posterior distribution follows immediately from our normality 
assumption 
 ( )| , ~ ,iidi iNΣ Σw xβ β  (4.18) 
 
This model is completed by choosing prior distributions of the forms: 
 ( ) ( )( )11, ,  and ,N V W Rρ ρ−−Σ∼ ∼ββ β  (4.19) 
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4. 4. Empirical Results 
In this paper, we examine whether the dichotomous choice question, the multinomial 
choice question, and the modified multinomial choice question elicit similar WTA 
distributions. We use the derived WTA distributions from the dichotomous choice question 
as the base line to examine how the incentive and informational properties of the multinomial 
choice formats (both basic and modified) influence the location and the precision of the 
derived WTA distributions. In particular, since the dichotomous choice question and the 
modified multinomial choice question are incentive compatible, we expect that the mean 
WTAs derived from the modified multinomial choice question would close to the mean 
WTAs derived from the dichotomous choice question. Second, the response from a 
multinomial choice question or a modified multinomial choice question contains more 
information than the response from a dichotomous choice question. In particular, the 
response from a multinomial choice question or a modified multinomial choice question 
provides the relative values between the chosen alternative and all the other alternatives in 
the choice set. However, the response from a dichotomous choice question only provides the 
relative value between two alternatives proposed in the dichotomous choice question. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that the WTA distributions derived from the multinomial choice 
question or the modified multinomial choice question would be more precise than the WTA 
distributions derived from the dichotomous choice question.  
Applying the estimation procedures described in the previous section and the 
algorithm fully documented in the appendix, we estimate the respondents’ WTA. Specifically, 
choosing alternative 0 as the status quo, an individual’s WTA for each policy alternative 
relative to the status quo can be defined as 
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Instead of using a non-informative prior, we use some prior information in our 
posterior simulation since the sample size with respect to each question format is small. In 
particular, six sets of bid values to each alternative are used in this survey. These bid values 
are designed using soil rental rates and current conservation payments in federal programs 
such as CRP. These sets of bid values are presented in Table 14. We use the values close to 
the mean of the bid values used in the survey as the prior mean of the 'sβ , {115, 45, 35, 30, 
135}. In addition, the prior variance-covariance of the 'sβ  are set as 400 5I . The prior 
information is employed in the estimation across the three samples. Since our interest is to 
compare the WTA distributions derived from these elicitation question formats, by using the 
same prior information, the difference in estimation results should comes from the data, not 
the prior. We run our posterior simulators for 110,000 simulations and discard the first 
10,000 simulations as the burn-in.  
 
Table 4.14 Bid Values 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Grazing 105 125 145 90 115 95 
19 ft crop, 59 ft prairie 30 40 50 40 55 65 
120 ft crop, 15 ft prairie 15 25 35 25 30 45 
120 ft crop, 30 ft prairie 20 30 40 30 40 60 
Native Perennial Cover 115 135 155 110 130 120 
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Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 present the posterior means (β ) and dispersions ( 2σ ) 
associated with the WTAs for the landscape alternatives in flat land scenario derived from 
each format, respectively. The dispersions reported here are the diagonal elements in the 
variance-covariance matrix corresponding to each alternative. Our result suggests, first, that, 
the mean WTAs derived from the multinomial choice question and the modified multinomial 
choice question are generally greater than the mean WTAs derived from the dichotomous 
choice question. The mean WTAs derived from the modified multinomial choice question 
are closer to that derived from the dichotomous choice question.  
 
Table 4.15 Estimated Mean WTA (Flat Land) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 Grazing 19 ft  
crop,  
59 ft  
prairie 
120 ft  
crop,  
15 ft  
prairie 
120 ft  
crop,  
30 ft  
prairie 
Native  
Perennial 
Cover 
Dichotomous choice sample 93.22 
(10.05) 
64.42 
(9.24) 
31.72 
(10.80) 
23.66 
(10.51) 
96.23 
(12.56) 
Multinomial choice sample 114.17 
(15.47) 
58.75 
(14.11) 
48.71 
(14.79) 
49.52 
(14.72) 
120.71 
(15.09) 
Modified multinomial choice sample 106.05 
(17.81) 
57.60 
(15.79) 
42.58 
(15.72) 
43.47 
(16.66) 
118.09 
(17.42) 
 
 
Table 4.16 Estimated Variance of WTA (Flat Land)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 Grazing 19 ft  
crop,  
59 ft  
prairie 
120 ft 
crop,  
15 ft  
prairie 
120 ft  
crop,  
30 ft  
prairie 
Native  
Perennial 
Cover 
Dichotomous choice sample 4.94 
(3.32) 
3.78 
(2.96) 
2.44 
(1.98) 
2.85 
(2.70) 
5.93 
(4.14) 
Multinomial choice sample 17.50 
(14.67) 
3.14 
(3.23) 
2.40 
(2.41) 
3.82 
(4.14) 
18.18 
(14.80) 
Modified multinomial choice sample 9.06 
(7.76) 
6.78 
(8.25) 
4.99 
(6.20) 
6.73 
(11.04) 
27.40 
(28.75) 
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Second, as shown in Figure 4. 7, the WTA distributions derived from the modified 
multinomial choice question and the multinomial choice question are more dispersed than the 
WTA distributions derived from the dichotomous choice question. A possible explanation 
may be that both the multinomial choice and the modified multinomial choice questions 
provide the respondents more policy alternatives, and thus more information, than a 
dichotomous choice question. Therefore, respondents are required to put more cognitive 
effort in answering the multinomial choice question and the modified multinomial choice 
question. With more alternatives under consideration, respondents may be more likely to 
make mistakes or not patient to give a precise answer, leading to WTA distributions derived 
from the multinomial choice questions that are more dispersed than the WTA distributions 
derived from the dichotomous choice question. In other words, the cognitive effort burden 
embedded in the multinomial choice question and the modified multinomial choice question 
dominates the informational advantage of these methods. Third, the WTA distributions 
derived from the modified multinomial choice question are more dispersed than the WTA 
distributions derived from the multinomial choice question. This may be explained by that 
respondents were less familiar to the modified multinomial choice question and were more 
likely to make mistakes to the valuation question. 
Table 4.17 and Table 4.18 present the posterior means and variances associated with 
the WTA distributions derived from the three elicitation methods for the landscape 
alternatives in rolling land scenario, respectively. First, similar to the results in the flat land 
scenario, the mean WTAs derived from the multinomial choice question and the modified 
multinomial choice question are greater than the mean WTAs derived from the dichotomous 
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Figure 4.7 Predicted Distribution of WTA (Flat Land) 
 
Table 4.17 Estimated Mean WTA (Rolling Land) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 Grazing 19 ft  
crop,  
59 ft  
prairie 
120 ft  
crop,  
15 ft  
prairie 
120 ft  
crop,  
30 ft  
prairie 
Native  
Perennial 
Cover 
Dichotomous choice sample 94.97 
(10.97) 
54.17 
(11.73) 
20.64 
(12.02) 
19.37 
(13.17) 
91.38 
(12.66) 
Multinomial choice sample 115.46 
(15.68) 
68.19 
(14.52) 
49.88 
(15.21) 
41.93 
(14.04) 
113.93 
(14.95) 
Modified multinomial choice sample 117.21 
(21.90) 
69.93 
(21.88) 
45.80 
(21.04) 
37.47 
(21.50) 
111.53 
(19.36) 
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Table 4.18 Estimated Variance of WTA (Rolling Land)  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 Grazing 19 ft  
crop,  
59 ft  
prairie 
120 ft 
crop,  
15 ft  
prairie 
120 ft  
crop,  
30 ft  
prairie 
Native  
Perennial 
Cover 
Dichotomous choice sample 6.80 
(10.30) 
5.42 
(6.22) 
4.86 
(5.51) 
5.68 
(7.98) 
2.30 
(2.63) 
Multinomial choice sample 15.89 
(11.83) 
2.81 
(2.82) 
2.39 
(2.32) 
3.70 
(3.56) 
14.12 
(11.82) 
Modified multinomial choice sample 12.80 
(10.88) 
4.74 
(4.40) 
4.85 
(5.10) 
5.31 
(5.02) 
14.14 
(14.26) 
 
method. The mean WTAs derived from the modified multinomial choice question are closer 
to those derived from the dichotomous choice question. 
Second, as shown in Figure 4.8, the WTA distributions derived from the modified 
multinomial choice question and the multinomial choice question are more dispersed than the 
WTA distributions derived from the dichotomous choice question. Third, the WTA 
distributions derived from the modified multinomial choice question are more dispersed than 
the WTA distributions derived from the multinomial choice question. 
4. 5. Final Remarks 
Stated preference methods are useful to estimate the economic value of non-market 
goods. In this study, we use the dichotomous choice question, the multinomial choice 
question, and the modified multinomial choice question to estimate farmers’ WTAs to adopt 
perennial strips in landscape in the state of Iowa. In particular, fifteen versions of the survey 
using the dichotomous choice method, one version of survey using the multinomial choice 
method, and one version of survey using the modified multinomial choice method are 
employed in split samples. We develop an estimation procedure jointly estimate the fifteen 
versions of survey using the dichotomous choice method. In addition, we proposed an  
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Figure 4.8 Predicted Distribution of WTA (Rolling Land) 
 
estimation procedure by extend the bid function model suggested by Cameron (1988) to 
estimate individuals’ WTA distributions using the multinomial choice question and the 
modified multinomial choice question. 
Our result suggests, first, the mean WTAs derived from the multinomial choice 
method and the modified multinomial choice method are greater than the mean WTAs 
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derived from the dichotomous choice method. Consistent with our expectation, the mean 
WTAs derived from the modified multinomial choice question are closer to the mean WTAs 
derived from the dichotomous choice question. Second, the WTA distributions derived from 
the modified multinomial choice question and the multinomial choice question are more 
dispersed than that derived from the dichotomous choice question implying that the cognitive 
effort burden embedded in the multinomial choice method and the modified multinomial 
choice method dominates the informational advantage of these methods. Third, since 
respondents were less familiar to the modified multinomial choice method, the WTA 
distributions derived from this method are the most dispersed. 
There are three value elicitation formats and six alternatives included in this study. 
The respondents’ true valuation is not directly observable since their responses to the value 
elicitation questions only reveal whether their WTAs are greater or smaller than the proposed 
bid values. Thus, these methods require a large number of responses to obtain precise WTA 
estimates. However, the sample size of each question format we used in this study is small. 
Applying the prior information in hand across the question formats allowed us to discern the 
properties of these value elicitation formats. Our future work may include (a) applying these 
question formats in surveys with more observations to further examine their properties, and 
(b) involve different number of alternatives in surveys to explore what is the reasonable 
number.   
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Appendix 4.A The Gibbs Sampling Algorithm for Dichotomous Choice Question 
 Drawing from ( )1| , ,p yβ −Σ w . First, define  
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Similar to a SUR model, we obtain 
 ( )1| , , ~ ,y N V ββ β−Σ w  
where 
 1 1' 1 ' 1
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⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= Σ + = Σ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑X w X X . 
Step 4.  Drawing from ( )1 | , ,p yβ−Σ w . Making use of techniques like those employed in 
the SUR model, we obtain 
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Step 5.  Drawing from ( )1| , ,p yβ −Σw . Denote *jiw  as a new draw for respondent 
'i s  WTA for alternative j from ( )1| , ,p yβ −Σw . For i=1,…,N,  
 ( )~ ,i iN Σw X β . 
The respondent is randomly assigned to choose the preferred alternative between two 
alternatives, say j and k. for the respondent chooses alternative j, if  
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 * * ,     , 1, , ,  and 
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otherwise, start over. 
A Gibbs sampler proceeds by simulating (in order) from the above posterior 
conditional distributions. For our prior, we set {115; 45; 30; 35; 130}β = , 400 kV Iβ = , 
10ρ = , and 410 kR I−= .  
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Appendix 4.B The Gibbs Sampling Algorithm for Multinomial Choice Question and 
Modified Multinomial Choice Question 
Step 1. Drawing from ( )1| , ,p yβ −Σ w . First, define  
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Similar to a SUR model, we obtain 
 ( )1| , , ~ ,y N V ββ β−Σ w  
where 
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⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= Σ + = Σ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑X w X X . 
Step 2. Drawing from ( )1 | , ,p yβ−Σ w . Making use of techniques like those employed in 
the SUR model, we obtain 
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Step 3. Drawing from ( )1| , ,p yβ −Σw . Denote *jiw  as a new draw for respondent 'i s  
WTA for alternative j from ( )1| , ,p yβ −Σw . For i=1,…,N,  
 ( )~ ,i iN Σw X β . 
For 0iy = , if  
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A Gibbs sampler proceeds by simulating (in order) from the above posterior 
conditional distributions. For our prior, we set {115; 45; 30; 35; 130}β = , 400 kV Iβ = , 
10ρ = , and 410 kR I−= .  
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Appendix 4.C Images and descriptions of associated landscape alternatives 
Image Description 
Status Quo 
 
No restrictions on tillage, crop rotation or any other 
management operation or practice, other than those currently 
required (such as conservation compliance requirements, 
manure management plans, etc.). No restrictions on pesticide 
or fertilizer. 
 
Grazing 
 
This farm program supports partial conversion of cropland, 
that is HEL or near streams, to pasture with rotational 
grazing. If there are waterways within the fields, the 
waterways must be protected from cattle. Herd size and type 
can be chosen by the farmer. No restrictions on pesticide and 
fertilizer. 
 
59 ft. Crop, 19 ft. Prairie  
 
This farm program purchases HEL or wetlands for 
biodiversity reserves of about 640 acres in every township. 
Reserves enhance habitat and water quality. The program 
also supports converting HEL acres to rotating strips of corn 
and soybeans (59 ft. wide) that alternate with non-rotating 
perennial prairie mix strips (19 ft. wide). Prairie seed from 
the strips could be marketed. No tillage restrictions for non-
HEL acres. Reduced tillage requirements continue for HEL 
acres. No restrictions on pesticide and fertilizer. 
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Image Description 
15 ft. Crop, 120 ft. Prairie  
 
This farm program provides support for strips of annual 
crops alternating with perennial plant strips. Perennial strips 
= 15 ft wide, crop strips = 120 ft. wide. No restrictions on 
choice of crop rotations in the annual strips. No tillage 
restrictions for non-HEL acres. Tillage restrictions and 
BMP’s remain on HEL acres. No restrictions on pesticide or 
fertilizer. 
 
30 ft. Crop, 120 ft. Prairie 
 
 
This farm program provides support for strips of annual 
crops alternating with perennial plant strips. Perennial strips 
= 30 ft wide. Crop strips =120 ft. wide. No restrictions on the 
choice of crop rotation in the annual strips. No tillage 
restrictions for non-HEL acres. Tillage restrictions and 
BMP’s remain on HEL acres. No  restrictions on pesticide 
and fertilizer. 
 
Native Perennial Cover 
 
This farm program provides support for converting some or 
all cropland to native perennial cover, such as switch grass, 
that is harvested for biofuel. No restrictions on pesticide and 
fertilizer. 
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Chapter 5. General Conclusions 
 
5. 1. General Discussion 
The three essays in this dissertation contribute to the contingent valuation literature. 
The contingent valuation method is widely used in estimating the economic value of 
nonmarket goods. Thus, it is important to understand the incentive and informational 
properties embedded in the contingent valuation method to improve the economic value 
estimates derived from this method. The first essay examines the impact of a consequential 
survey on respondents’ willingness to pay, the second essay examines the influence of 
intertemporal aspects of the contingent valuation survey on respondents’ willingness to pay, 
and the third essay provides a comparison regarding respondents’ willingness to accept 
derived from various value elicitation question formats.  
In the first essay, we examine how a consequential survey may influence 
respondents’ willingness to pay. It has been argued that respondents will respond to survey 
questions truthfully, if they believe the result of the survey might potentially have some 
influence on an outcome they care about, the property is known as consequentiality. In the 
2003 and 2005 versions of Iowa Lakes Survey, we directly elicited respondents’ perceived 
consequentiality toward this survey in ordinal responses ranging from “1” to “5.” To address 
the potential endogeniety of individuals’ “consequentiality” responses, in the 2005 version of 
survey, we randomly provided a subsample of the respondents an article from the Iowa 
Conservationist suggesting their responses were important and would have impact on policy 
decisions. This exogenous treatment allows us to separate out the impact of consequentiality 
on respondents’ contingent valuation responses. 
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We employed a Bayesian treatment effect model to test the impact of respondents’ 
perceived consequentiality on their willingness to pay for a hypothetical water quality 
improvement scenario. The results of the jointly estimated willingness to 
pay/consequentiality models suggested, first, that the exogenous treatment positively 
influenced respondents’ perceptions of consequentiality toward the survey, though the 
magnitude of this effect is small. Second, the mean willingness to pay derived from 
respondents who perceived this survey as being policy irrelevant was smaller than those who 
perceived the survey as being positively consequential. Finally and most importantly, 
consistent with the “knife-edge” result suggested by Carson and Groves (2007), the mean 
willingness to pay derived from respondents who perceived the survey as being somewhat 
positive consequential was statistically indifferent from the mean willingness to pay derived 
from respondents who perceived the survey as being definitely consequential.   
The second essay provides an empirical test of the commitment cost theory suggested 
by Zhao and Kling (2001, 2004). It is typically conceived that respondents’ willingness to 
pay in a contingent valuation exercise depends on some intrinsic value of the good that is 
invariant over time. However, the commitment cost theory suggests that respondents’ 
willingness to pay for a good at a particular point of time depends not only on the intrinsic 
value of the good, but also on the timing of the decision and the characteristics of the market 
environment. In particular, respondents would report a lower willingness to pay if they 
believed that their transaction decision could be delayed and more information about the 
transaction would be available, or if they believed that it is more difficult to reverse the 
transaction decision.  
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In this study, we employed respondents’ perceived intertemporal aspects elicited in 
the 2003 and 2005 versions of Iowa Lakes Survey to explore the theoretical results. First, 
half of the 2003 sample was randomly promised a second chance to revisit the contingent 
valuation referendum if the referendum was not passed. With this explicit statement of delay, 
we expected the treated respondents to report a lower willingness to pay. Our result 
suggested that the exogenous treatment did not influence respondents’ willingness to pay.  
Second, in the 2003 version of survey, we tested the influence of individuals’ 
responses regarding their perceived potential for revisiting the contingent valuation 
referendum, obtaining more information about the proposed water quality improvement 
scenario, and canceling an ineffective water quality improvement project, i.e., delay, learning, 
and reversing, on their willingness to pay. Our results suggested, consistent with the theory, 
that respondents report a greater willingness to pay if they perceived a greater chance that the 
government would cancel an ineffective project. However, contrary to the theory prediction, 
the interaction between respondents’ perceived potential for delay and learning had a positive 
impact on their willingness to pay.  
Third, we tested the impact of delay in another perspective. In particular, half of the 
2005 sample was informed that they would have no opportunity to revisit the referendum in 
the future. With this explicit statement of no delay, we expected the treated respondents to 
report a higher willingness to pay. Our result suggested that this exogenous treatment did not 
influence the treated respondents’ willingness to pay. 
Finally, we tested the influence of respondents’ knowledge on their willingness to pay. 
The theory suggested that respondents would hold a higher willingness to pay if they were 
more knowledgeable about the transaction or if they believed that less information would be 
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provided in the future. In the 2005 version of survey, respondents’ perceived potential for 
delay, their self-reported knowledge level and knowledge increment about the general water 
quality in Iowa lakes were elicited. Our results suggested that, consistent with the theory, the 
more knowledgeable the respondents were, the higher willingness to pay the respondents had. 
However, respondents’ knowledge increment did not influence their willingness to pay in 
either direction. Lastly, respondents’ perceived potential for delay had a positive impact on 
their willingness to pay, which was contrary to the theory would predict.  
It could be argued that the potential endogeniety may exist in individuals’ “delay” 
responses. Normally, an exogenous treatment regarding respondents’ perceived delay could 
be used to control for the endogeniety issue. However, the exogenous treatments we 
employed in the 2003 and 2005 survey did not successfully influence the treated 
respondents’ perceived delay. Therefore, this conjecture could not be tested. In the future, an 
effective treatment would be needed to control for the endogeniety of delay perception.    
The third essay examines whether the dichotomous choice question, the multinomial 
choice question, and the modified multinomial choice question elicit comparable willingness 
to accept distributions. These value elicitation formats are different in their incentive and 
informational properties which may influence the location and the precision of their derived 
willingness to accept distributions. Our results suggested that the modified multinomial 
choice question and the multinomial choice question produced similar willingness to accept 
distributions. In particular, the means of willingness to accept distributions derived from 
these questions were greater than those derived from the dichotomous choice question. The 
willingness to accept distributions derived from these questions were more dispersed than 
those derived from the dichotomous choice question. Finally, compared to the willingness to 
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accept distributions derived from the multinomial choice question, the willingness to accept 
distributions derived from the modified multinomial choice question were more dispersed, 
and the means of the willingness to accept distributions derived from the modified 
multinomial choice question were closer to those derived from the dichotomous choice 
question.  
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Appendix 1.  Iowa Lakes Survey 2003 
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Appendix 2.  Iowa Lakes Survey 2005 
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Appendix 3.  Landscape Survey 
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